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Abstract
Using micro-level data, we examine the effects of Russia’s 2001 flat rate income tax reform on
consumption, income, and tax evasion. We use the gap between household expenditures and
reported earnings as a proxy for tax evasion with data from a household panel for 1998-2004.
Utilizing difference-in-difference and regression-discontinuity-type approaches, we find that large
and significant changes in tax evasion following the flat tax reform are associated with changes in
voluntary compliance. We rule out alternative explanations based on changes in tax enforcement
effort, savings behavior, expenditures on durables, and others. We also find that the productivity
response of taxpayers to the flat tax reform is small relative to the tax evasion response. Finally, we
develop a feasible framework to assess the deadweight loss from personal income tax in the
presence of tax evasion based on the consumption response to tax changes. We show that because
of the strong tax evasion response the efficiency gains from the Russian flat tax reform are at least
30% smaller than the gains implied by conventional approaches.
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1. Introduction
Tax evasion is a pervasive worldwide phenomenon. It is widely believed that high personal
income tax rates are partially responsible for high levels of tax evasion everywhere, especially in
emerging markets. High personal income tax rates are also often associated with negative effects
on economic activity. This study offers a broadly applicable method to assess the impact of
changes in personal income tax on the level of tax evasion and productivity by using consumption
and income data from household surveys.1 The study also develops a framework to assess the
welfare costs of distortionary personal income taxes in the presence of tax evasion based on the
consumption response to tax changes. We exploit unique features of the well known Russian flat
rate tax reform of 2001 to identify the effect of changes in the personal income tax on tax evasion,
productivity, and welfare.

Using a variety of statistical methods, robustness checks, and the

richness of the data in the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS), we conclude: i) that
the tax evasion in response to the tax change was large, but, ii) that the productivity response was
relatively weak and, hence, iii) that the welfare gains from cutting tax rates were considerably
smaller than was thought before.
In January 2001, Russia introduced a fairly dramatic reform of its personal income tax when
it became the first large economy to adopt a flat rate personal income tax. The Tax Code of 2001
replaced the previous conventional progressive rate structure with a flat tax rate of 13 percent.2
Over the next year, the Russian economy grew at almost 5 percent in real terms, while revenues
from the personal income tax increased by over 25 percent in real terms (Table 1). Despite the fact
that economic theory does not precisely predict the effect of reduced tax rates on the degree of tax

1

In our definition, the productivity response includes changes in labor supply, occupations, effort, location, and other
margins of adjustment that change the amount of total resources available to households for consumption. In contrast,
the tax evasion response involves shifting resources from one account (‘non-reported income’) to another (‘reported
income’) without affecting the amount of total resources available to households for consumption.
2
Estonia, first, and then Latvia and Lithuania had introduced flat rate personal income taxes during the early 1990s.
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evasion,3 advocates of the flat tax largely credit Russia’s flat tax reform with this dramatic turn in
revenue performance. Advocates also credit the flat tax with beneficial changes in real economic
activity.

More recently, several other Eastern European countries (Serbia, Ukraine, Georgia,

Romania, Slovakia, and Macedonia) have adopted flat rate income tax reforms. At the latest count,
more than 20 countries have implemented or are about to implement some form of flat rate income
tax following, many believe, Russia’s steps (Sabirianova Peter et al. 2007). Although after-reform
data are not yet fully available for these countries, in some cases (for example, Slovakia) flat tax
reform is again being credited with significant revenue turnarounds and the stimulation of economic
activity. More recently, several OECD countries have been giving serious consideration to the
adoption of flat tax reforms.4
Russia’s flat tax reform was quite revolutionary because it involved a large country and
because it affected many people, not only the rich. But beyond the excitement Russia’s flat tax
reform has created, so far very little solid evidence has been provided on its impact on tax evasion
or real economic activity. As shown in Table 1, after a period with negative real growth and high
inflation rates that culminated with the financial crisis of 1998, the Russian economy started a
period of solid economic growth and more stable prices in 1999. By the time the flat rate of income
tax was introduced in the Tax Code of 2001, real GDP had grown by 9 percent in 2000 and 5
percent in 2001. At the same time, in the most striking performance, real collections from the
personal income tax grew at close to 26 percent in 2001, the year of the reform, and continued to
grow by 21 percent in 2002 and almost 12 percent in 2003; in posterior years the growth rate
declined significantly. This burst in collection performance for the new personal income tax can
potentially be explained by the better performance of the real economy, by improved voluntary
compliance from taxpayers, and/or by stricter enforcement of the tax system via higher penalties
3

For a discussion, see Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein (1998) and Alm (1999).
See Owens (2007). In addition, several policy makers praised the Russian flat tax reform. For example, during a state
visit of Russia’s President Putin to the U.S. in 2001, President George W. Bush said, "I am impressed by the fact that
[Putin] has instituted tax reform -- a flat tax. And as he pointed out to me, it is one of the lowest tax rates in Europe. He
and I share something in common: We both proudly stand here as tax reformers."
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and enforcement efforts by the tax authorities. Although real income grew during 2001 and the
years after, the figures in Table 1 suggest that something else may have been behind the significant
increase in real collections from the personal income tax. An explanation based on higher penalties
for tax evasion is the least plausible of the other alternate causes because a significant feature of the
new Russian Tax Code was that it generally reduced the draconian tax penalties that had been in
force during the 1990s.5 Therefore, it would seem worthy to investigate the potential roles that
improved voluntary compliance and better administration enforcement efforts may have played in
the sharp increase in collections.
Measuring the level of tax evasion is notoriously difficult, requiring programs of random
intensive taxpayer audits such as the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP)
conducted by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (Slemrod 2007). Most countries, including Russia,
have not carried out this type of program. In this paper, we use economic theory and micro data on
income and household spending to detect the changes in tax evasion after the tax reform.
Specifically, we estimate the difference between reported consumption and reported income, which
we call the consumption-income gap.6 Since the reform only decreased marginal tax rates for some
groups of people, we use the variation in the consumption-income gap across time and taxpayers to
identify and estimate the tax evasion response.
Our approach is distinct from previous studies that also used data on income or expenditure
composition to study tax evasion. This previous research typically uses a group of taxpayers who
are known to comply (e.g., employees subject to withholding) as a benchmark to assess the true
income for a group of taxpayers in question (e.g., self-employed).7 Given this dichotomy of tax

5

See Martinez-Vazquez, Rider, and Wallace (2008).
Our approach to detect tax evasion is broadly related to the literature utilizing discrepancies between different data
sources to study evasion, cheating, smuggling, and other unreported activities. For example, Fisman and Wei (2004)
use the difference between Chinese and Hong Kong customs data to assess the effect of duties on tax evasion. In a
similar spirit, Marion and Muehlegger (2008) use the observed changes in diesel sales in response to dyeing untaxed
diesel to infer evasion of taxes on diesel for on-road purposes.
7
For example, the IRS in the U.S. reports that for 2001 filed returns only 1 percent of wages and salaries were
underreported, but that an estimated 57 percent of non-farm proprietor income was not reported (IRS 2006).
6

3

compliers and non-compliers, one can use the discrepancy between the two groups to approximate
the level of tax evasion. Thus, for example, Pissarides and Weber (1989) exploit differences in food
consumption; Lyssiotou, Pashardes, and Stengos (2004)8 look at differences in the composition of
consumption; and Feldman and Slemrod (2007) examine differences in charitable contributions to
impute income hidden from taxes. For Russia, we cannot use this “benchmark” approach because
tax evasion was widespread, with employees quite likely practicing as much tax evasion as the selfemployed. For example, employers and employees often have engaged in explicit and implicit
agreements to conceal a part of wages to reduce the tax burden. The modes of tax evasion have
included employees receiving compensation in the form of envelopes with cash, purchase of life
insurance policies and other fringe benefits, interest from bank deposits made by the employer, not
reporting income from a second job, failure to consolidate incomes from different sources, and so
on.
When tax evasion is present in all groups, the approach based on total expenditures and total
income is more appropriate. Implicitly, this approach has been adopted by the Russian System of
National Income and Product Accounts, in which disposable income is constructed as a sum of
household aggregate expenditures and savings, and the difference between imputed disposable
income and the officially reported income is included in income accounts as unobserved labor
compensation. In a similar vein, the first comprehensive study of the Russian flat tax by Ivanova,
Keen and Klemm (2005) uses the ratio of total income to total expenditures as a proxy for
compliance and finds a statistically significant increase in the income-to-expenditure ratio among
high earners one year after the Russian tax reform. However, largely due to methodological
constraints and different focus, their study did not isolate the effect of tax changes on voluntary
compliance from other confounding explanations for the increase in the income-to-expenditure ratio

8

Lyssiotou, Pashardes, and Stengos (2004) use the consumption demand approach in measuring tax evasion. They
observe that tax evasion influences the composition of consumption, and that one can impute true income by adjusting
income to match consumption shares.
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and concludes that “it remains unclear whether this [increase in compliance] was due to the
parametric tax reform or to accompanying changes in enforcement” (p.398).
Our methodology allows us to isolate the decline in tax evasion in Russia following the flat
tax rate reform that was due to a change in voluntary compliance in response to the flat tax rate
from other causes, including the potentially greater enforcement effort realized by the tax
administration authorities. Our approach is based on three pillars. The first is the identification of
the treatment group based on after-reform reported income.

The essential advantage of this

identification strategy is that after the reform households facing the flat marginal tax rate should
have no behavioral response to the pre-reform tax rate thresholds. The second pillar is the theorydriven specification of the consumption-income gap function that includes tax evasion
determinants, life-cycle factors, consumption composition shifters as well as time-invariant
unobservable household characteristics (and time-varying regional shocks in some specifications).
The third pillar is the regression-discontinuity type estimation that provides a consistent estimate of
the treatment effect at the point of discontinuity (the tax bracket threshold). In this case, the
treatment effect is less likely to be confounded with other factors because taxpayers just below and
just above the threshold as applied to the post-reform income are likely to be very similar (e.g., they
should have the same probability of being subjected to the tax audit).
Together, these methods can effectively isolate the voluntary compliance response to tax
changes from other factors such as increased enforcement effort by the tax administration, changes
in saving behavior, credit market development, changes in the composition of consumption,
supplementary revisions to the Tax Code, and so on. We estimate a relatively large tax evasion
response of households to changes in tax rates in the magnitude of 10-11% for the entire treatment
group and at the point of discontinuity. We also demonstrate that the response of the consumptionincome gap to changes in tax rates is insensitive to alternative definitions of income and
consumption (including those with net savings, in-kind consumption, and purchases of durables)

5

and to various subsamples that eliminate households subject to deductions, different payroll rates,
etc.
In addition to estimating the tax evasion response, we also assess the effect of the tax reform
on productivity by estimating the consumption response to tax rate changes for the whole treatment
group and at the point of discontinuity. Our consumption-based analysis of productivity gains from
the reform has two important advantages. First, in contrast to the labor supply response, the
consumption response works like a sufficient statistic for many margins of adjustment including
labor market participation, hours of work, efforts, location choice, and occupational mobility.
Second, unlike the taxable income response, the consumption response is immune to changes in tax
evasion as well as to income shifting activities in the sense that the consumption response correctly
measures changes in resources available to households.
We find the productivity effect to be positive but small relative to the tax evasion effect (2%
on average). These findings are important for social welfare calculations because, as Chetty (2007)
argues, welfare gains from tax cuts can depend on the ability of taxpayers to evade taxes, and one
has to separate the productivity response from the evasion response to correctly compute
deadweight losses from taxes. If the (perceived) cost of tax evasion is mainly in being caught and
fined rather than in the real cost of hiding incomes, the deadweight loss from income tax could be
much smaller than implied by a typically large elasticity of (taxable) income with respect to the tax
rate. If the evasion response dominates the productivity response as in the Russian case, the
efficiency gain from the tax reform would be smaller than implied by the income response. We
develop a novel framework to assess the deadweight loss from personal income tax in the presence
of tax evasion. The framework, which utilizes both consumption and income responses to tax
changes, accommodates both real (resource) and penalty costs of tax evasion.

Using this

framework, we show that adjustments for tax evasion can significantly alter the magnitude of
deadweight losses from personal income taxes and the corresponding welfare gains from tax

6

reform. We estimate that the deadweight losses adjusted for tax evasion are at least 30% smaller
than the deadweight losses based on conventional approaches that utilize only the income response
to tax changes.
The results of Russia’s reforms are valuable for many other countries. As we noted above,
another 20 or so countries besides Russia have recently introduced flat rate tax reforms and several
other countries are considering the adoption of this type of reform. An important implication taken
from the present analysis of Russia’s experience is that the adoption of a flat rate income tax can
lead to significant reductions in tax evasion and increased tax revenues in countries where tax rates
are high and tax evasion levels are significant. But these revenues are likely to come from better
reporting and increased compliance, and much less from changes in labor supply and increased
economic activity.
The paper also makes several methodological contributions to the empirical public finance
literature. The paper offers a general approach to estimating the extent of tax evasion in different
countries provided there are available longitudinal household income-expenditure surveys and
intermittent tax reforms with significant changes in tax burdens. Although these conditions will not
always be met, the list of countries where the methodology can be applied far exceeds that of
countries that implement extensive random audit programs to examine the extent of tax evasion.
Also the paper: (i) suggests a methodology for separating tax evasion and productivity responses to
changes in tax rates; (ii) shows that the response of consumption to tax changes is the right
approach to calculating deadweight losses; and (iii) contributes empirical evidence on the
relationship between tax rates and tax evasion, which has not been clearly established in past crosssectional studies
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we derive a tax evasion
function using the difference in the log of consumption and income. Next, in Section 3, we
introduce our data and descriptive statistics. In Section 4, we present the estimates of the tax

7

evasion function. Sections 5 and 6 discuss methodological issues and provide the estimates of the
flat tax effect using difference-in-difference and regression-discontinuity-type approaches.

In

Section 7, we investigate the productivity effect of the flat tax and develop a framework to assess
the deadweight loss from personal income taxes in the presence of tax evasion based on the
consumption response to tax changes. Finally, in Section 8, we draw some conclusions.
2. Data and Variables
We use the 1998, 2000-2004 rounds of the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey
(RLMS), a household panel survey which is based on the first national probability sample drawn in
the Russian Federation and administered by the University of North Carolina.9 This is a very rare
household database with a sufficiently long panel before and after the flat tax reform. The panel
structure of the data is useful in implementing before and after analysis while controlling for
constant unobservable household and local characteristics in estimations. Having post-reform data
for four consecutive years is particularly valuable for capturing the full extent of the response to tax
rate changes since households may need some time to learn about implications of the reform,
convince themselves that the reform is permanent, and make appropriate adjustments (see Johnson,
Parker, and Souleles (2006) for a recent example of the dynamic response in the U.S.). There were
8,343 to 10,670 individuals who completed the adult (age 14 and over) questionnaire and 3,750 to
4,718 households who completed the household questionnaire in each round. These individuals and
households reside in 32 oblasts (regions) and 7 federal districts of the Russian Federation.10
The key variables in our analysis are household consumption and household reported
income. The household questionnaire contains detailed information on separate expenditure items

9

We do not use the 1994-1996 rounds because of high macroeconomic volatility during this period, with annual
inflation reaching 214% in 1994, and apparent noise in respondents’ answers, especially, with regard to food items. In
addition, the early questionnaires did not include contractual earnings, which are the key variable for our analysis as
well as several important expenditure items such as medicine, car repair, etc. RLMS was not conducted in 1997 and
1999.
10
Russia has 89 regions and 7 federal districts. The RLMS sample consists of the 38 randomly selected primary sample
units (municipalities) that are representative of the whole country.
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purchased in the last 30 days (unless indicated otherwise): more than 50 items of food at home and
away from home, alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages, and tobacco products purchased in the last
7 days;11 expenses on clothing and footwear in the last 3 months; gasoline and other fuel expenses
(3 subcategories); rents and utilities, and 15-20 subcategories of services (such as transportation,
repair, health care services, education, entertainment, recreation, insurance, etc.).

These

expenditure items are aggregated into monthly consumption of non-durable items (C1), which is our
baseline measure of consumption. The second consumption measure (C2) adds transfer payments
in the last 30 days (6 subcategories include alimonies and various contributions in money and in
kind to individuals outside the household unit). Although transfer payments are not typically
considered as part of consumption, households may derive extra utility from altruistic motives by
transferring resources to relatives (Laitner and Juster 1996, Altonji, Hayashi and Kotlikoff 1997,
Kopczuk and Lupton 2007). In addition to non-durable consumption items, households also report
durables purchased in the last 3 months (10 subcategories include major appliances, vehicles,
furniture, entertainment equipment, etc.). Combining one third of these durable purchases and C1
gives us a third measure of monthly consumption (C3). For each expenditure item, it is known
whether or not a household purchased the item, as well as the amount of the purchase.12
Total household income is the combined income of all household members after taxes from
all jobs and other regular sources. The labor income is reported by the reference person as after-tax
payments received by all household members from all places of work in the form of money, goods,

11

Monthly expenditures on food are computed as the sum of weekly expenditures on individual food items multiplied
by 30/7=4.286. Since some food items are storable (flour, sugar, potatoes and vegetables) and expenditures on these
goods tend to be seasonal (typically, in the fall), we use top coding for unreasonably high amounts of food purchases
conditional on household structure and food prices. The procedure of top coding of food items is described in
Gorodnichenko, Sabirianova Peter and Stolyarov (2008).
12
When a household purchased the item but did not report the amount of the purchase, the missing amounts are imputed
by regressing the log of expenditure on the complete interaction between year dummies and federal district dummies,
controlling for the size of the household, number of children (18 years old or younger), and number of elderly members
(60+). The procedure is described in Gorodnichenko, Sabirianova Peter, and Stolyarov (2008). The subcategories with
the largest number of missing values include utilities (2.12% of the sample), gasoline and motor oil (1.63%),
transportation services (1.54%), and contributions to non-relatives (1.35%). Missing values for other subcategories are
trivial.
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and services in the last 30 days. Non-labor income includes pensions, stipends, unemployment
benefits, rental income, interests and dividends, alimonies, and child care benefits. Our base
income measure includes regular portions of labor and non-labor income, as defined above (Y1).
The second income measure (Y2) adds irregular receipts from the last 30 days that consist of lumpsum payments from insurance, amounts received from the sales of material assets, and 11
subcategories of contributions from persons outside the household unit, including contributions
from relatives, friends, charity, international organizations, etc.
generally not included in the definition of income.13

These irregular receipts are

Finally, since households may derive

supplementary income from household production, we also calculate the third income measure (Y3)
by adding Y1 and income from selling household-grown, mostly agricultural products.14 As with
expenditures, missing income amounts for the subcategories of non-labor income, irregular receipts,
and household production are imputed using the regression approach described in Gorodnichenko,
Sabirianova Peter, and Stolyarov (2008). Overall, imputations are minimal. Labor income is not
imputed.
We compare per capita consumption and income levels between RLMS and official
National Income and Products Accounts (NIPA) in Figure 1. The RLMS measures of consumption
and income are made comparable to the NIPA measures by using similar data definitions (see the
notes to Figure 1). Consumer expenditures in RLMS and NIPA are close during most of the sample
period,15 but reported disposable income in RLMS is as much as 30 percent lower than the official

13

A large component of the irregular income is private transfers (typically from relatives). Because these transfers are
not taxed, taxpayers do not have strong incentives to conceal this source of income, and thus adding transfers does not
affect tax evasion directly. However, Y2 can help us rule out explanations based on intra-family transfers in cases
where households have large consumption because they are supported by other households.
14
Income from household production is calculated by multiplying the amount of sold agricultural products (33
subcategories) and local price per unit of product (see Gorodnichenko, Sabirianova Peter and Stolyarov 2008 for
details).
15
The 1998 discrepancy can be explained by the fact that the RLMS had been conducted right after the August financial
crisis while NIPA’s numbers were averaged over the year.
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figures. While NIPA consumption and income data are internally consistent,16 RLMS reported
income is always below consumption throughout the whole period, although the gap has been
declining in recent years.17 This gap cannot be attributed to dissaving because most households
have negligible stocks of financial assets and dissaving in such scale could not have lasted for years.
Thus, the difference between reported income and consumption should not be used as a
measure of saving, as some of the previous studies have done (e.g., Guariglia and Kim 2003).
Instead, we compute gross saving as the sum of purchases of stocks, bonds, and other securities,
current cash savings, and money lent. Figure 1 shows the gross saving rate of RLMS households
and contrasts it with the saving rate in the Household Budget Survey (HBS), the official source of
household income and expenditure statistics in Russia. Both sources show similar low and stable
saving rate of households (3-6%). To check the importance of borrowing for the consumptionincome gap, we also calculate net savings as the difference between the net change in financial
assets and the net change in liabilities. The net change in financial assets includes purchases of
stocks, bonds, and other securities in the last 30 days, plus current cash savings in the last 30 days,
minus sales of stocks, bonds, and other securities in the last 30 days, minus the amount of spent
savings, foreign currency and valuables in the last 30 days.

The net change in liabilities is

computed as money borrowed in the last 30 days, minus money lent outside the household unit in
the last 30 days, minus payments to creditors in the last 30 days, plus amounts received from
debtors in the last 30 days. The sum of C1 and net savings is defined as C4.

16

NIPA eliminates the discrepancy between reported income and consumption by construction. Disposable income is
constructed as the sum of household aggregate expenditures and savings, and the difference between imputed
disposable income and the officially reported income is included in the income accounts as unobserved labor
compensation.
17
The design of the RLMS questionnaire makes it difficult for households to balance consumption expenditures with
income: total consumption expenditures are never asked, questions on income and consumption are given in separate
sections, and the questionnaire is filled out by the interviewer, not by an interviewee. Thus, households do not observe
the totals for itemized incomes and consumption expenditures simultaneously to be able to match them. If households
try to roughly match consumption to income, our estimates should be interpreted as a lower bound.
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All monetary values at the household level are expressed in December 2002 prices and
adjusted for regional cost-of-living differences by using the regional value of a fixed basket of
goods and services.18
The household-level data are supplemented by individual information on the head of the
household, including employment participation, earnings, age, schooling, tenure, and characteristics
of the primary employer such as formal organization, ownership, location, and firm size. The head
of the household is defined as the person with the largest income. If more than one individual
within a household have similar incomes, then the oldest person is defined as the head of the
household. In a few exceptional cases of multiple household members with the same age and
income, the priority is given to the first person in the roster files.
3. Conceptual Framework: Derivation of Tax Evasion Function
Our theoretical starting point is the permanent income hypothesis (PIH) which suggests that
consumption equals permanent income.

Consequently, consumption contains important

information about resources (income) available to households. If consumption consistently deviates
from reported income holding everything else constant, one may suspect that some part of the
income is not reported. In fact, tax authorities often use the discrepancy between income and
expenditures to detect tax evasion. Thus, the differential between consumption and income can
inform us about whether and to what extent households evade taxes. In the rest of this section, we
formalize this idea and develop an econometric specification of the tax evasion function.
Let Yht* be the (true) income received by household h at time t. Households may choose to
conceal a part of their income and report only YhtR = Γ htYht* , where Γ ht is the fraction of reported
current income. We can model Γ ht as a function of observable characteristics Sht that influence tax
18

To adjust for monthly inflation, we express all flow variables in December prices of the corresponding year by using
a country average monthly CPI and the date of interview. If the date of the interview is in the first half of the month, the
previous month CPI is used. If the date of interview is in the second half of month, the current month CPI is used.
Then the annual (December to December) CPI for each 32 oblasts (regions) is applied to convert the flow variables into
December 2002 prices.
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compliance: Γ ht = Γ( Sht ) = exp( −γ Sht + error ) . In addition to job and worker characteristics, the
vector Sht might also include various central and regional government policies, in particular, the
2001 flat tax reform, which is our focus.
Further, let’s assume that current household income Yht* is related to permanent income YhtP
as Yht* = Η htYhtP , where Η ht = Η ( X 1,ht ) = exp(η X 1,ht + error ) captures deviations of current income

from permanent income due to life cycle factors X 1,ht such as age, schooling, employment
participation, number of children, etc. and due to transitory shocks absorbed into the error term.
Accounting for the life-cycle factors is necessary because the difference between permanent/lifetime income and current income exhibits strong life-cycle dynamics (e.g., Hubbard, Skinner, and
Zeldes 1995, Gourinchas and Parker 2002, and Haider and Solon 2006).
Since service flows of durable goods are often unknown, we should further assume that
expenditures on non-durables Cht constitute a fraction of permanent income, that is, Cht = ΘhtYhtP .
This fraction is fixed if the consumption aggregator for durables and non-durables has a CobbDouglass form in the utility function.19 We allow the fraction Θ to vary across households. In
particular, we let Θht = Θ( X 1,ht ) = exp(θ X 2,ht + error ) , where X 2,ht consists of the number of
household members and number of children in order to account for economies of scale, while the
number of elderly members, age, schooling, and marital status are included as taste shifters. This
list of variables is commonly used in empirical consumption functions (e.g., Blundell et al. 1994,
Browning and Lusardi 1996).
Given our assumptions, we obtain three important relationships:
19

We assume constant unitary income elasticity of consumption because we consider the total consumption of nondurables goods. The ratio of non-durables to income is fairly stable in macroeconomic data, which is consistent with
the constant unitary elasticity. Although Pissarides and Weber (1989) and several subsequent papers allow the income
elasticity to be different from one, those studies deal with food consumption and other specific goods instead of total
consumption. We also note that even if the household survey had collected information on the value of durables,
households have strong incentives to underreport consumption/ownership of durables because it is highly visible and
indicative of true earnings. Hence, using that information to construct the service flow of durables and consequently
total consumption would most likely underestimate the extent of tax evasion. Our results hardly change when we add
the recent purchases of durables to the consumption of non-durables, as will be shown below.
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ln YhtR − ln Yht* = −γ Sht + error ,

(1a)

ln Yht* − ln YhtP = η X 1,ht + error,

(1b)

ln Cht − ln YhtP = θ X 2,ht + error.

(1c)

Even though Yht* and YhtP are not observable, we can still estimate our parameter of interest

γ if we combine equations (1a-1c) into the observed consumption-income gap function (2). Since
vectors X 1,ht and X 2,ht are likely to overlap considerably, we let X ht be a union of X 1,ht and X 2,ht
to simplify notation and write our final specification as
ln Cht − ln YhtR = γS ht + β X ht + u h + ε ht ,

(2)

where γ shows the effect of Sht on tax evasion; uh is a time-invariant component of the error term
that accounts for risk aversion, preferences, and other constant household and local characteristics
affecting consumption and/or income, and εht is a random error term.20
Following Pissarides and Weber (1989), Lyssiotou, Pashardes, and Stengos (2004), and
others, we assume that the consumption of non-durables, which is our preferred measure of
consumption, is correctly reported, and the income reported in the household survey is used for tax
purposes. If consumption of non-durables is under-reported, we underestimate the extent of the tax
evasion. Johnson and Moore (2005), among others, find that income reported in surveys is typically
greater than income reported for tax purposes.

This pattern implies that we may again

underestimate the extent of tax evasion.
On the right-hand side of equation (2), we have two vectors of covariates S and X. The
vector S accounts for individual variation in tax evasion due to age, schooling, marital status, tenure,
type of job (enterprise vs. self-employment), sector (private vs. public), and the firm size for the
20

The consumption-income gap function has a convenient semi-log functional form. From the permanent income/lifecycle theory of consumption, the consumption-income ratio should be equal to one and the log of this ratio is zero.
Thus, we can interpret the coefficients in equation (3) as percentage deviations of the consumption-income ratio from
the “steady state”. Using the log-ratio also improves the statistical properties of our estimates as the consumptionincome ratio and the error in income underreporting (Alexander and Feinstein 1987) are highly skewed.
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head of the household. It also contains year dummies and a trend variable for the after-reform
period. Based on our earlier discussion, the vector X includes age, schooling, marital status,
employment participation, number of household members, number of children, and number of
elderly members. Since some of the factors are present in both vectors (e.g., age, schooling, and
marital status), we have to be cautious not to attribute the estimates solely to tax evasion. In
summary, if proper controls are included, the consumption-income gap function (2) becomes a
useful tool for analysis of tax evasion.
The permanent income hypothesis assumes that households have the ability to borrow and
lend to smooth consumption. This could be a strong assumption in the Russian context given that
the saving rate and the stock of financial assets are very low, and one may be inclined to use the
cash-on-hand as a chief determinant of consumption (instead of permanent income).21 In this case,
the consumption-income gap function continues to be the relevant tool for studying tax evasion
because constrained households should spend all available after-tax income on consumption
(equation (1b) can be omitted in this case). Therefore, violations of PIH are not likely to lead to any
major distortions of our results in practice.
4. Tax Evasion and Consumption-Income Gap

In this section, we perform a series of estimations to verify that the consumption-income gap
is an informative indicator of tax evasion behavior. We do not have estimates of tax evasion from
tax audits like the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) in the U.S. However, we
know from studies based on the TCMP and similar programs in other countries that tax evasion is
correlated with observable characteristics of taxpayers. We can utilize this information to check
whether our estimates of the consumption-income gap function are consistent with common tax
evasion determinants.

21

We also note that the inability to borrow in formal credit markets can be mitigated by intra-family transfers.
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We begin by reporting household fixed effect estimates of specification (2) for four
combinations of income and consumption in Table 2.22 All four specifications show that the
consumption-income gap is declining with age but not changing with schooling.23 Although we
cannot interpret results on age, schooling, and marital status as factors of tax evasion, the sign of
coefficients on age is consistent with other studies showing that the tax evasion is less likely among
older (and risk-averse) workers (e.g., Clotfelter 1983, Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein 1998, Slemrod
and Yitzhaki 2002). Married individuals are estimated to have a significantly smaller consumptionincome gap.24 The estimated positive effect of tenure might be due to accumulated additional
experience regarding tax evasion opportunities while working at the same job. The coefficient on
working at an enterprise (as opposed to being self-employed) is negative and statistically
significant, and it is consistent with previous U.S. studies showing that self-employed individuals
tend to have higher noncompliance rates (Feinstein 1991, Feldman and Slemrod 2007, Slemrod
2007).
Firm size is another important determinant of tax evasion, but the previous literature
provides mixed evidence. The size effect is found to be positive in the U.S. firm-level studies
(Slemrod 2007), but negative for Cameroon businesses (Gauthier and Gersovitz 1997) and positive
or negative depending on whether an individual taxpayer in Jamaica works in the private or public
sector (Alm, Bahl, and Murray 1990). Our results show that the consumption-income gap is smaller
for Russian workers employed in larger enterprises.

Since larger firms are subject to more

extensive tax-compliance monitoring, workers are less likely to have loopholes in underreporting

22

We experimented with other definitions of consumption, such as the one that uses a non-itemized food expenditure
variable or the one that includes net change in financial worth (net savings). For these and other measures, we find
similar results which we do not report. None of our results change when we control for the number of earners.
23
We experimented with polynomials in age as additional controls and found statistically insignificant concavity in age.
24
This finding is opposite to what typically found in the U.S. literature (e.g., Feinstein 1991, Martinez-Vazquez and
Rider 2005, Slemrod 2007). The marriage tax penalty and complex married return are two common explanations for
why married individuals in the U.S. are more likely to evade. However, the Russian tax law does not allow for separate
tax filing of married people, and the marriage tax penalty does not exist.
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their incomes. Larger firms also find it harder to implement tax evasion schemes with a variety of
workers.25
We also find that the gap is largest for workers in the state sector, which is in line with the
finding by Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova Peter (2007a), who show that a greater consumptionincome gap in the public sector in Ukraine reflects widespread corruption and bribery of public
sector employees. Overall, estimated coefficients on control variables are broadly consistent with
the results reported in evasion studies based on tax audits.
One may expect that households are more likely to evade in the local jurisdictions where
people are skeptical about whether the majority of the population pays taxes. In 1998 and 2002
(coincidentally before and after the tax reform), the RLMS collected information on attitudes and
perceptions about taxes. We construct a district-level measure for the share of individuals who
believe that most people don’t pay taxes or pay taxes on less than half of their income and use it as
an additional regressor in the consumption-income gap function. We find an overwhelmingly
strong relationship between the consumption-income gap and average tax perceptions.26 In the
districts where people tend to believe that most people do not pay taxes, households indeed have a
larger consumption-income gap (see Table 3). Thus, a consumption-income gap is likely to provide
meaningful information about tax evasion at the household level.
Overall, the estimates of the consumption-income gap function are consistent with a tax
evasion story and its common determinants. Obviously, tax evasion is a concealed act and therefore
without audit data we cannot test directly whether the consumption-income gap truly captures the
extent of latent tax evasion. However, we provide compelling, indirect evidence to support our
claim that the consumption-income gap is related to tax evasion.

25

The negative tax evasion effect of the firm size could also be linked to the employer size-wage premium literature
(Brown and Medoff 1989). Employees of large firms earning a wage premium will have weaker incentives to seek
additional employment in the shadow economy.
26
Alm, Martinez-Vazquez, and Torgler (2006) discuss the influence of these perceptions on taxpayers’ tax morale in
Russia.
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5. Tax Evasion Function: Difference-in-Difference Approach
5.1. Identifying the Effect of Flat Tax Reform

Apart from confirming our intuition that the consumption-income gap is informative about
tax evasion, Table 2 contains another remarkable result: after being constant prior to 2001, the
consumption-income gap started to continuously decline over time. Table 2, Panel B reports a large
and statistically significant coefficient on the after-reform trend variable indicating an average 6-7%
decline in the consumption-income gap per year from 2001 to 2004. The timing of the decline
coincides with the Russian flat income tax reform and cannot be explained by changes in the saving
rate which was stable for RLMS households during the period of our analysis.
However, we cannot attribute the decline in the consumption-income gap solely to the flat
tax reform because other events occurred at the same time. For example, the credit market boom in
the 2000s may also have reduced the consumption-income gap by providing incentives to report
income in order to obtain a housing mortgage or other credit lines (Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova,
2007b). The 2001 tax reform by itself was comprehensive and was not limited to the changes in the
personal income tax rates (Ivanova, Keen, and Klemm 2005). Among the most significant tax code
changes are i) the replacement of separate contributions to four social funds by the unified social tax
paid by employers at the overall reduced rate, ii) abolished rules for multiple job holders to submit
tax declarations, iii) a considerably higher 35% rate for income received from gambling, prizes,
voluntary insurance contributions and excessive interest in attempt to combat various schemes of
tax avoidance, and iv) a new system of tax deductions providing incentives to declare income
(Russian Tax Code 2000, see also Appendix 1 for the summary of key changes).27
In principle, the on-going reforms of tax administration might also have contributed to better
income reporting. Available descriptive statistics, however, show ambiguous changes in the work
of the tax administration. Using the Federal Tax Department archive, we have assembled time27

Appendix 1 shows that many of these changes were irrelevant for a vast majority of taxpayers. At the same time, the
cornerstone elements of the personal income tax system such as withholding of taxes by employers did not change.
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series information on tax audits and charges for tax law violations and reported these data in Table
4. Some measures favor the tax enforcement argument. For example, both the ratio of received to
accrued additional tax payments due to tax audits and the number of blocked bank accounts for tax
related violations did increase after 2000. At the same time, the number of on-site tax audits, total
amount of charges, and the number of managers and entrepreneurs charged for breaching tax law
have declined considerably after year 2000, which could be due, in part, to less tax evasion caused
by the tax reform. If the tax enforcement argument is valid, then it could also explain some of the
decline in the consumption-income gap after 2000.
As a first step in separating the tax evasion effect of reduced marginal rates from other
factors, we use the difference-in-difference approach considering those who are affected by the flat
tax reform (higher tax brackets) as a treatment group while those who are not affected (lower tax
brackets) as a control group. In particular, we estimate the following specification:
ln Cht − ln YhtR = γ Sht + β X ht + μ d httreat + α ( d httreat × D p ) + ψ D p + uh + ε ht ,

(3)

where d httreat = I (τ ht < τ ht −1 ) is a dummy variable indicating if the head of the household is in the
treatment group (i.e., the group that experiences a decline in marginal tax rates conditional on Yht* )
and Dp is a dummy variable for the post-reform period 2001-2004.
The difference-in-difference approach is a very attractive tool as it controls for non-tax
factors that simultaneously affect control and treatment groups. The key element of equation (3) is
the specification of the treatment and control groups which we discuss in the next subsection.
5.2. Treatment and Control Groups

Since the pre-reform marginal tax rates are correlated with the pre-reform level of current
income, there is a potential source of endogeneity in equation (3) as the dummy variable d httreat can
be correlated with the error term εht. For example, households can endogenously fall into the
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treatment group due to their choice of income and other behavioral responses.28 This endogeneity
problem is particularly acute when we use pre-reform reported incomes to classify taxpayers into
treatment and control groups in the presence of tax evasion.
To understand the source of the biases, we re-write equation (3) in first differences, consider
only two periods t–1 and t (before and after the reform), and drop the subscript h to simplify
exposition:
Δ ln Ct − Δ ln Yt R = γΔSt + β ΔX t + α I (τ t < τ t −1 ) + Δε t ,

(4)

where τ t is the flat tax rate in year t that is independent of income and τ t −1 is the pre-reform
marginal tax rate as an increasing step function of current (reported and hidden) income Y * . The
relevant treatment group I (.) consists of households experiencing a decline in the rate that they face
(not the rate they decide to pay), defined on the basis of their total after-reform income that is

τ t −1 (Yt* ) − τ t (Yt* ) > 0 . If the flat tax reform has reduced tax evasion, then α should be negative,
ceteris paribus.
Because Yt * is not observable, suppose we use the pre-reform reported income to identify
treatment and control groups. In this case,

τ t −1 (Yt −R1 ) − τ t (Yt −R1 ) = τ t −1 (Yt −R1 ) − τ t (Yt* )
= ⎡⎣τ t −1 (Yt* ) − τ t (Yt* ) ⎤⎦ − ⎡⎣τ t −1 (Yt* ) − τ t −1 (Yt*−1 ) ⎤⎦ − ⎡⎣τ t −1 (Yt*−1 ) − τ t −1 (Yt −R1 ) ⎤⎦ , (5)
144
42444
3 144424443 144424443
true treatment
productivity bias ≥ 0
tax evasion bias ≥0
14444444
4244444444
3
bias ( t−1)

where the first equality follows from the flat tax in the post-reform period. Classification into
treatment and control groups based on observed income is correct only when τ t −1 (Yt −R1 ) − τ t (Yt −R1 ) has
the same sign as τ t −1 (Yt* ) − τ t (Yt* ) . However, as equation (5) shows, the treatment group based on
pre-reform reported income excludes wage earners that increase productivity and pass the threshold

28

See Triest (1998), Moffitt and Wilhelm (2000), and Auten and Carroll (1999) for exposition and a survey of the
endogeneity problem as applied to labor supply and earnings responses without tax evasion.
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(i.e., τ t −1 (Yt* ) − τ t −1 (Yt*−1 ) ≥ 0 ). In addition, the treatment group also excludes households whose
current income is in the upper brackets while the reported income is in the lower bracket (i.e.,

τ t −1 (Yt*−1 ) − τ t −1 (Yt R−1 ) ≥ 0 ). These are the households who are most likely to be “treated” by the
reduced tax rate. In other words, assignment into control group is affected by behavioral responses
to tax changes. Since the response of the control group is contaminated with the response of the
treated group, the difference between control and treatment groups constructed on the basis of prereform income is going to be smaller. As a result, such misspecification will produce an upward
bias in the estimate of α, implying that the effect of the flat tax reform on tax evasion is less likely
to be found.29
Now suppose we use the post-reform reported income to identify treatment and control
groups. One can interpret this approach as running the reform backwards from flat tax to a
progressive tax scale. Under the flat tax, all taxpayers face the same marginal tax rate irrespective
of income; therefore, the assignment into the treatment and control groups is not affected by
behavioral responses to differential tax rates. In this case,

τ t −1 (Yt R ) − τ t (Yt R ) = τ t −1 (Yt R ) − τ t (Yt* )
= ⎡⎣τ t −1 (Yt* ) − τ t (Yt* ) ⎤⎦ − ⎡⎣τ t −1 (Yt* ) − τ t −1 (Yt R ) ⎤⎦ ,
144
42444
3 144424443
true treatment

(6)

bias ( t ) = tax evasion bias ≥0

where the first equality again follows from the flat tax. Note that if we assume that post-reform
income is fully revealed (i.e., Yt R = Yt* ), then using post-reform income to identify the treatment
effect (and treatment/control groups) yields unbiased estimates.

One can show that

29

To understand the sign of the bias, consider the following hypothetical case. Suppose there is an individual who
receives 60,000 rubles before and after the reform (there is no productivity effect), and the reform reduces the marginal
tax rate for people with more than 50,000 rubles in annual income. Before the reform, the individual evades taxes and
reports only 40,000 rubles in earnings. After the reform, he reports 60,000 rubles. Also, assume that the genuine
response of the control group is zero, that is, actual and reported income do not increase for this group because they
continue to face the same tax rate. If the pre-reform reported income is used to identify the treatment group, then an
individual would fall into the control group. In this case, the response of the control group would be large because
taxpayers choose to underreport their income before the reform. It follows that holding everything else constant, the
estimated treatment effect would be small because the response of the control group is large.
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bias (t − 1) − bias(t ) = τ t −1 (Yt R ) − τ t −1 (Yt −R1 ) > 0 , and hence the overall bias in defining the treatment
group is smaller when we use the post-reform income. Furthermore there should be fewer people
affected by the tax evasion bias in year t because there are no longer incentives for households to
cluster just below the threshold, and therefore there would be fewer people whose true current
income is above the threshold while their reported income is just below the threshold (see Section
6). At the same time, because taxpayers can conceal some income even when the tax schedule is
flat and hence some misclassification of the treatment group taxpayers in the control group is
inevitable, we underestimate the effect of the tax reform.
In summary, the flat tax reform itself provides a unique identification opportunity. Since all
people face the same marginal tax rate, the flat rate cannot be correlated with the after-reform
reported income. By applying the pre-reform rates to the post-reform income (or counterfactual
rates), we can avoid the problem of reverse causality and provide a lower bound on the effect of
reduced tax rates on tax evasion.
To understand another potential source of endogeneity, recall that εht is the composite error
term that originates in the three equations - 1a, 1b, and 1c. The second equation (1b) contains a
transitory error component that might be correlated with the marginal tax rate. Unusually high
income in one period is not generally consumed immediately.

As a result, large transitory

movements in current income can generate a negative serial correlation in ( ln Yht∗ − ln YhtP ), which can
lead to a negative correlation between ( ln Yht∗ − ln YhtP ) and pre-reform marginal tax rates if the rates
are positively associated with the pre-reform income (so called “reversion to the mean” problem,
see Moffitt and Wilhelm (2000)). We should note, however, that a vast majority of households in
the RLMS are liquidity constrained (only a tiny fraction of households report positive savings), and
thus transitory income is likely to be consumed at the time it occurs. Fortunately, in addition to
actually received earnings, the RLMS provides information on contractual earnings that we can use
to create treatment and control groups.

Contractual earnings have a much smaller transitory
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component than the earnings actually received last month, and therefore they are less vulnerable to
“the reversion to the mean” problem.30 To further minimize the adverse effects of transitory shocks,
we follow Gruber and Saez (2000) and use the 4-year average of contractual earnings in the postreform period to construct treatment and control groups.
In light of the discussion in this subsection, we define the treatment group as households
whose heads earned more than 3,625 rubles (net of tax and after a 1% contribution to the pension
fund) per month from all reported jobs at least once or on average after the tax reform. This amount
is equivalent to 50,000 rubles of gross annual earnings - an upper threshold for the 12% bracket
under the 2000 annual budget law. With a 1% contribution to the pension fund, the control group
faces the same 13% marginal tax rate before and after the reform. Thus, the design of the Russian
reform not only offers a unique solution to the endogeneity of marginal tax rates by making the tax
schedule flat, but also provides a ‘clean’ control group by keeping the same marginal tax rate for the
lowest tax bracket. We also note that the definition of the treatment group is not affected by
standard tax deductions, which cannot be claimed by individuals earning more than 20,000 rubles
per year (Russian Tax Code 2000).
We report selected statistics describing the treatment and control groups in Appendix Table
A1. In short, households in the treatment group, which comprises of about 35% of all households,
are larger and have more children, and the heads of those households are younger, more educated,
and more likely to be married and employed than households in the control group. Working heads
of households in the treatment group also have less experience with the same employer and tend to
work in the private sector and larger firms.

30

Contractual earnings are defined as the average monthly earnings after taxes over the last 12 months that the
employee is supposed to receive regardless of whether or not it was paid on time. Thus, contractual earnings also help
to deal with the problem of irregularity of payments and wage arrears. The coefficient α might be negative if the reform
period coincided with a smaller volatility in actual earnings (wage arrears, which were quite prevalent in the earlier
years of the transition, started to fall after 1998).
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5.3. Estimates of the Tax Evasion Response

Table 5 reports the estimates of equation (3), with the treatment group defined on the basis
of post-reform actual earnings received last month. We find a large and significant decline in the
consumption-income gap for the treatment group after 2000. The estimate of α is in the range
between −0.11 and −0.09, suggesting that income grew by approximately 9−11% more than
consumption, ceteris paribus. Figure 2 illustrates a clear structural break in the consumptionincome gap dynamics in 2001 for both groups and a more pronounced decline for the treatment
group. The fact that the consumption-income gap decreases for the control group shows the
importance of other factors discussed in subsection 5.1.
Table 6 shows the estimates of α from several alternative specifications of the treatment
group that use contractual earnings. The estimates of α based on contractual earnings are negative
and statistically significant, but they are slightly smaller in magnitude than the estimates based on
the actual earnings received in the last month. As follows from our earlier discussion of the
reversion to the mean problem, the measures of earnings that contain a large transitory component
tend to overstate in absolute terms the effect of the treatment on the consumption-income gap. This
is exactly what we find when we compare the estimates based on these two measures of earnings.
We also restrict the sample to the households whose head’s implied gross annual earnings
are between 20,000 and 100,000 rubles and apply the above definition of the treatment group to the
restricted sample. We use the restricted sample to remove the influence of standard deductions and
eliminate the differential effect of the regressive unified social tax paid by employers (see Appendix
1). For each worker in the restricted sample, employers should pay the same 35.6% rate of the
unified social tax after 2000. Another benefit of the restricted sample is that the treatment group
would have faced the same 20% rate if the pre-reform tax scale had remained after 2000 (the next
30% bracket begins with 150,000 rubles). As a robustness check, we excluded households with
recent purchases of real estate and sizeable education expenses in order to avoid the potential
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contamination of treatment and control groups due to the housing and social deductions described in
Appendix 1. In another robustness check, we excluded households with the recent purchases of real
estate, vehicles, and stocks that title organizations are required to report to tax authorities.
According to the earlier Russian tax law, tax brackets were not automatically adjusted for
inflation, and thus, an increase in nominal wages could push taxpayers into higher tax brackets
(“bracket creep” effect). To assess the consequences of inflation adjustment, we apply the same
criteria of the restricted sample to the earnings adjusted for inflation in December 2000 prices. The
treatment group is also defined after deflating the post-reform income to December 2000 prices.
Finally, we add interactions between district dummies (at the county level) and year dummies to
control for changes in regional characteristics such as the degree of credit market development, tax
enforcement, and other time-varying regional factors.

We also allow individual and firm

characteristics to have different effects before and after the reform.
Regardless of modifications in specifications, samples, and definitions of income and
consumption, the magnitudes of α coefficients are large and vary from –0.126 to –0.091 for
monthly contractual earnings.31 Using the 4-year average of post-reform contractual earnings gives
similar estimates. Even when we replace the dummy variable for the post-reform period by the
post-reform time trend, we obtain a large and statistically significant decline in the consumptionincome gap for the treatment group over time. The estimates vary from –0.044 to –0.031. In
summary, we find that the households experiencing a decrease in the marginal tax rate have a
greater reduction in the consumption-income gap.
To verify that our results make economic sense, we also test if a decline in the consumptionincome gap is larger for individuals who are more likely to switch to tax compliance after the tax
reform. Only individuals with potentially legitimate labor incomes can reveal their true earnings.

31

We do not adjust our estimates for changes in the volatility of the error term because the variability in both
consumption and income was slowly decreasing over time. See Gorodnichenko, Sabirianova Peter and Stolyarov
(2008) for more details.
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For example, it is unlikely that employees in the public sector will disclose the portion of their
income that originates from bribes and other forms of corruption, no matter how low tax rates are.
At the same time, the majority of employees in the private sector as well as the self-employed can
report their earnings since there is often nothing criminal in their labor market activity. Hence, the
consumption-income gap should decrease more strongly for the private sector workers than for
employees in the public sector.
In addition, Russian private firms have greater incentives to compensate skilled workers
who earn greater wages in ways that reduce their wages reported for tax purposes. After the reform
the tax pressure is smaller, and hence the consumption-income gap should decline more for skilled
than unskilled workers. To test these two predictions, we modify the baseline specification (3) with
additional interaction terms. We report results in Table 7. Consistent with theoretical predictions,
the decline in the consumption-income gap is largest for private sector employees and for white
collar workers within the private sector.
Finally, we extend our baseline estimates of the consumption-income gap dynamics by
accounting for changes in saving, expenditures on durables, and home production.32 First, we note
that growth of durable purchases and a decline in production of home-grown food should increase
the consumption-income gap, not decrease it. Only a reduction in net saving will be consistent with
the declining gap. To examine the importance of these factors for our treatment effect estimates, we
use alternative definitions of income and consumption that include components such as purchases of
durable goods (C3), net savings (C4), and net income from home production (Y3).

These

alternative measures of consumption and income yield estimates of the treatment effect (Table A2)
similar to what we observe for our baseline definitions of income and consumption. We also do not
find a differential response in the saving rate, share of expenditures on durables, or share of income

32

Because net savings and durable purchases are highly volatile and irregular, we use these components only in
supplementary (not primary) specifications. Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to calculate the service flow of
durables, which is the appropriate measure of durable consumption.
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from home production for treatment and control groups between 1998-2000 and 2001-2004. As a
result, our treatment effect estimates remain largely unaffected by alternative specifications.
6. Tax Evasion Function: Examining the Response around the Threshold

The DID approach assumes that the treatment impacts subjects uniformly, while in practice
the strength of the treatment effect may be heterogeneous. For example, the response of upperincome households to changes in marginal tax rates can be different from the response of middleincome households. It is also possible that subjects are heterogeneous in ways that are difficult to
control for due to unknown specification of functional forms, unobservables, etc.

The DID

estimates might be contaminated by the differential evasion response of treatment and control
groups to the various shocks and policy changes that coincided with the introduction of the flat tax
such as tax administration reform.

Even though we control for the local differences in tax

enforcement via interacting district and year dummies, it is still possible that the negative α might
be attributed in part to collection efforts if tax enforcement focuses primarily on those households
who are more likely to be in the treatment group (i.e., high earners).
Discontinuity of marginal tax rates at the known threshold values of income provides an
opportunity to use the regression discontinuity (RD) design to assess and validate our results from
the difference-in-difference approach. Under certain, relatively mild assumptions this alternative
approach can address the issues we discuss above, and provide a consistent estimate of the
treatment effect at the point of discontinuity (threshold income). Since subjects just below and just
above the threshold as applied to the post-reform income are likely to be similar (e.g., they should
have the same probability of being subjected to the tax audit or the same propensity to consume
durables), the treatment effect is less likely to be confounded with other factors. When the subjects
are drawn from the same part of the income distribution, and they are minimally different along the
dimension that determines whether a subject is treated or not, then one can consider the assignment
of treatment as if it is random.
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We do not have a sufficient number of observations to implement RD in its classical form,
however we can use the RD intuition and apply weights to the DID regression, with weights as a
decreasing function of the distance from the threshold. Specifically, we estimate parameters by
minimizing

∑

N
h =1

ωhp {ln Cht − ln YhtR − γ Sht − β X ht − μ d httreat − α (d httreat × D p ) − ψ D p − uh } ,
2

(7)

where ω hp is a fixed household-specific weight calculated on the post-reform income. For any year
t in the post-reform period p, the weight is calculated as K ( ln Yht b−ln Yt )
R

#

∑

K ( ln Yst b−ln Yt ) , where K(.) is
s =1
N

R

#

the Gaussian kernel, Yt # is the threshold income at which marginal tax rate changes, and b is the
optimal “plug-in” bandwidth for the Gaussian kernel. The weight is a function of the distance
between the individual post-reform income and the pre-reform threshold value with higher weights
given to the observations that are closer to the threshold. We refer to equation (7) as the weighted
difference-in-difference (WDID) estimator.
Imbens and Lemieux (2007) suggest that this approach to estimating RD or RD-type
treatment effects has a number of advantages.

First, although we put a small weight on

observations distant from the threshold, we can use more information contained in the sample.33
Second, estimation and inference are straightforward since one can use the standard method of
weighted least squares. Third, we can easily control for other factors to further ensure that justbelow and just-above samples are balanced along dimensions other than income. Thus, weighed
DID serves our purposes well since it has desirable statistical properties and preserves RD intuition.
Again, for the same reasons discussed in Section 5, we use the post-reform income in
identifying the treatment group and calculating the weights. It is especially important for the RDtype estimates, which are based on the assumption that the running variable (income) should not
have jumps at points where a marginal tax rate changes. In other words, there is no behavioral
33

Given an optimal bandwidth, taxpayers with income 43% below or above the threshold gross income of 50,000 rubles
receive a weight less than 0.01.
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response to the threshold. This is not the case with the pre-reform income. Figure 3 reveals that
reported contractual earnings are clustered just below the threshold value (vertical line) in the year
2000, but not in 2001.34 This clustering prior to the reform manifests a behavioral response to the
discontinuity in the marginal tax rates. For example, households may choose to earn more income
(above the threshold) but report less just to be located at the point where their reported income is
taxed at the minimum rate. Clearly, we cannot use RD-type estimation when the treatment and
control groups are defined on the basis of pre-reform income. In contrast, using the post-reform
income satisfies the RD assumptions as the density of reported income exhibits no lumping around
the threshold.
We estimate equation (7) and report results in Table 8.35 Generally, the WDID estimates of
|α| are slightly larger than the DID estimates, although the difference between the estimates is not
statistically significant. Factors that could have pushed WDID estimates up or down relative to
DID estimates approximately cancel out. On the one hand, an estimate of |α| is likely be smaller in
WDID than in DID if the households that are further away from the threshold (e.g., upper-income
taxpayers experiencing the largest drop in the marginal tax rate) are more sensitive to changes in the
marginal tax rate. On the other hand, an estimate of |α| should be bigger in WDID if upper-income
households respond less strongly than households closer to the threshold. For example, households
with high incomes may continue to find it imprudent to report all income as the risk of
expropriation by the government or criminals could be so significant that it outweighs the benefits

34

Respondents tend to report rounded figures for their incomes, and this can explain spikes in histograms.
We perform a number of specification checks to verify that assumptions underlying RD-type estimation are satisfied.
The running variable (post-reform income) does not exhibit jumps at points where marginal tax rate changes. The
density of post-reform income is continuous in the relevant range. The estimated effect is fairly insensitive to the
choice of bandwidth. The estimate of the effect somewhat decreases in absolute value as we shrink the bandwidth. We
find little evidence that the consumption-income gap has jumps at the levels of income not associated with changes in
marginal tax rates (that is, we do not observe changes in the consumption-income gap at points of income that are not
associated with changes in the marginal tax rates). We cannot exploit another discontinuity at the income of 150,000
rubles per year when the marginal tax rate changes from 21% to 31% because we have a small number of households in
the top bracket.
35
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of switching to tax compliance. The net effect of these forces is roughly zero as WDID and DID
estimates are close to each other.
Similar to the DID estimates, the WDID estimates based on contractual earnings are
somewhat smaller than the estimates based on earnings actually received in the last month. Overall,
the WDID estimates strongly support our earlier finding that the consumption-income gap fell for
the treatment group after 2000.36
7. Welfare Analysis

Our findings so far indicate a positive effect of the Russian flat tax reform on income
reporting relative to consumption. The next question we would like to raise is whether the reform
had any productivity effect in the economy.37 In the presence of tax evasion we may be unable to
answer this question by simply estimating the earnings or earnings growth functions – a common
tool for measuring the productivity response of numerous tax reforms in developed countries (e.g.,
Feldstein 1995, Aarbu and Thoresen 2001). An observed increase in earnings could be due to an
actual increase in labor productivity as well as due to better reporting and compliance. In this
section, we are going to argue that one needs to look at the consumption side to separate these two
effects.
Given the permanent income hypothesis, changes in consumption should reflect changes in
permanent income and hence permanent productivity. After controlling for the windfall gains due
to lower taxes, the response of consumption to tax changes can capture to what extent people
choose to increase their income by supplying more labor services. This would be a genuine effect
of the tax reform on the real side of the economy which is a relevant variable for welfare
calculations. In contrast, changes in reported income consist of productivity and tax evasion effects.
36

To account for the possibility of taxpayer misclassification into treatment and control groups at the cutoff point, we
also experimented with excluding taxpayers with incomes within one percent deviation from the threshold. In these
experiments, the WDID estimates are very similar to our baseline estimates and hence not reported.
37
The productivity response to tax rates is not limited to changes in measurable hours of work but also includes changes
in effort, job reallocation, occupational mobility, etc. (Feldstein 1995).
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As Chetty (2007) argues, the latter effect can be irrelevant for welfare calculations since shifting
resources across agents in the economy does not affect social welfare as long as this shifting does
not alter the size of the ‘pie’ available to all agents.38
7.1. Theoretical Framework

To formalize these ideas, we follow Chetty (2007) and assume that workers maximize their
utility,

u (c, l , e) = c −ψ (l )
s.t. c = (1 − t )( wl − e) + e − z (e, t ) − g (e)
where c is consumption, w is wages, l is labor supply, e is the amount of tax evasion, t is tax rate,

ψ (l ) is disutility of labor, z (e, t ) = p(e)(et + F ) is the cost of being caught and fined, p(e) is the
probability of being caught and fined, F is the fixed penalty, and g (e) is the real (resource) cost of
tax

evasion.

The

corresponding

first

order

conditions

are

(1 − t ) w −ψ ′(l ) = 0

and

t − g ′( e) − ze′ ( e, t ) = 0 .
The social welfare function is given by W = u (c, l , e) + z (e, t ) + t ( wl − e) = wl − g (e) −ψ (l ) .
Note that z ( e, t ) is a pure transfer and therefore is irrelevant for social welfare. The marginal
change in welfare in response to the tax change is simply
∂W ∂wl ∂g ∂e ∂ψ ∂l
=
−
−
∂t
∂t ∂e ∂t ∂l ∂t
∂wl ∂g ∂e
∂l
∂wl ∂g ∂e
=
−
− (1 − t ) w = t
−
,
∂t ∂e ∂t
∂t
∂t ∂e ∂t

(8)

where the second equality follows from the first-order condition of utility maximization with
respect to labor supply. Consequently, the relative welfare losses due to income taxes can be
obtained as

38

Slemrod (1992) and others emphasize that the real response reflects how the tax system affects productive
opportunities available to firms and individuals, while tax avoidance such as income shifting across time, accounts,
branches, etc. does not influence the size of the ‘pie’ available to the society. In this respect tax avoidance is very
similar to tax evasion.
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1 ∂W
t ∂wl
e
∂e t
e
=
−
g ′( e)
=∈Y * −
g ′(e) ∈E .
wl ∂t
wl ∂t twl
∂t e
twl

(9)

Equation (9) highlights the three crucial pieces needed for welfare calculations: i) the elasticity of
tax evasion to tax rates ∈E ; ii) the marginal resource cost of tax evasion g ′( e) ; and iii) the elasticity
of total earned income to tax rates ∈Y * .
The first piece, the elasticity of the evasion response to changes in tax rates ∈E , is measured
by the response of the consumption-income gap to changes in tax rates. From our empirical
estimates, we know that ∈E ≥ 0 . From the first order condition for tax evasion, we have an upper
bound on the second piece, the marginal resource cost of tax evasion, g ′( e) = t − ze′ ( e, t ) ≤ t ,
provided that ze′ (e, t ) > 0 . This implies that welfare losses due to income taxes should be between
∈Y * − wle ∈E and ∈Y * if marginal resource cost of tax evasion are positive. Finally, we show below
that the remaining piece, the elasticity of total earned income to tax rates ∈Y * , can be well
approximated with the adjusted elasticity of consumption to tax rates, which we can estimate from
the available data.
Using the worker’s budget constraint, one can find that
∂c
∂t

∂ ( wl − e) ∂e ∂g ∂e ∂z ∂z ∂e
+ −
− −
∂t
∂t ∂e ∂t ∂t ∂e ∂t
∂wl ∂z ⎛ ∂g ∂z ⎞ ∂e
= −( wl − e) + (1 − t )
− + ⎜t −
− ⎟
∂t ∂t ⎝14
∂
e
∂3
e ⎠ ∂t
4244
= −( wl − e) + (1 − t )

=0

= −( wl − e) + (1 − t )

∂wl ∂z
− ,
∂t ∂t

where the last equality follows from the first order condition for e. The first term in this expression
is the marginal change in the after-tax reported income holding the reported income constant. The
second term is the after tax productivity response. The last term is the marginal change in the
penalty, ∂z ∂t = p (e) ⋅ e .
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Now we can link the elasticity of the consumption response to tax rates ∈C and the elasticity
of the earned income response to tax rates ∈Y * as follows:
∈C ≡

∂c t
t ( wl − e)
t
⎛ ∂wl t ⎞ wl
=−
+ (1 − t ) ⎜
⎟ − p ( e )e
∂t c
c
c
⎝ ∂t wl ⎠ c
⎛
⎞
⎛
⎞
(1 − t ) wl
te
= −κ + ∈Y * ⎜
⎟ − p ( e) ⎜
⎟
(1 − t ) wl + te − z (e, t ) − g (e) ⎠
(1 − t ) wl + te − z (e, t ) − g (e) ⎠
⎝14444
⎝
4244444
3
144444244444
3
sL

sE

= −κ + ∈Y * sL − p (e) sE ,

where κ is the effective tax rate defined as the ratio of paid tax liability to household consumption,
sL is the consumption share of after-tax resources a household would have if it paid taxes from the
full amount of its true income, and sE is the share of the gross gains from evasion ( te ) in total
household consumption. It follows that
∈Y * = sL−1 (∈C +κ + p (e) sE ) .

The value of p (e) sE is negligible and can be safely omitted. For example, if the marginal
tax rate is 20% (our baseline case) and people evade on a quarter of their income (which seems to
be a plausible upper bound given various estimates in the literature and the consumption to income
ratios in our sample), sE ≈ 0.2 × 0.25 = 0.05 . Since the probability of being caught is typically just
a few percent, then p( e) sE ≈ 0 .
The share of net gains from tax evasion te − z ( e, t ) − g ( e) in household consumption is even
smaller than sE , and thus sL should be just slightly below 1, or sL ≈ 1 .39 It follows that ∈Y * ≈∈C +κ
and one can use the consumption response adjusted for the effective tax rate as an approximate
measure of the total (true) income response, or productivity response. Importantly, the elasticity of

39

In general equilibrium, an entry into the tax evasion sector would eliminate abnormal profits from tax evasion.
Likewise, regulation could respond strongly to very ‘profitable’ tax evasion activities. For example, the IRS and tax
administrations in other countries regularly update the list of banned off-shores, accounting practices, etc.
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consumption response is similar to Feldstein’s (1999) elasticity of the taxable income response in
the sense that it works like a sufficient statistic absorbing adjustments along many margins.
Now we can put all pieces together and provide lower and upper bounds on welfare losses
due to income taxes:
∈C +κ ≤

1 ∂W
e
≤ ∈C +κ − ∈E .
wl ∂t
wl

(10)

This formula contains only observable quantities as we can estimate the elasticity of the tax evasion
to taxes ∈E , the elasticity of consumption to tax changes ∈C , the effective tax rate κ, and the share
of tax evaded income in total income using consumption and income data. In the next subsection,
we estimate the response of consumption to tax changes.
7.2. Productivity Effect of Flat Tax Reform

To contrast the response of consumption and income, we estimate consumption and income
equations using the consistent sample and the same set of control variables (including household
fixed effects) as in equation (3). Given the same set of controls, this is equivalent to the estimation
of both equations by the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) method. Again, our key parameter
is the coefficient on the interaction term between the treatment group and a dummy for the postreform period. As follows from the SUR properties, if we subtract the estimate of this coefficient in
the consumption equation from the one in the income equation we should obtain exactly the
estimate of α in the consumption-income gap function shown in Tables 5 and 6. Thus, we can link
and compare the previously estimated tax evasion effect with the new estimates of the reforminduced productivity effect.
Table 9 reports the treatment effect estimates from the two systems of simultaneous
equations: lnY1 and lnC1 as one system, and lnY2 and lnC2 as another one.40 Other combinations
of income and consumption equations produce similar results and they are not reported. The DID
40

The full specification of the income and consumption equations, lnY1 and lnC1, is provided in Appendix Table A3.
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estimates provided in Table 9 indicate a large increase in reported income (18–19%) for the
treatment group following the tax reform, but there is also a significant (although smaller) increase
in consumption (8–9%).41

As we have explained above, the difference between income and

consumption responses provides an estimate of the tax evasion effect, which is about 10-11%
according to our full sample estimates (also shown in Table 6). Given these estimates, we reach an
immediate, important conclusion that about 55% of the increase in reported after-tax income in the
treatment group is explained by the reduced tax evasion.
The WDID estimates, however, are smaller for income (10–13%) and close to zero for
consumption responses. Thus, DID and WDID methods give similar estimates of the tax evasion
effect but produce different results with respect to consumption gains. We will explain below why
there is a discrepancy between the WDID and DID estimates.
A decrease in the marginal tax rate creates windfall consumption gains since households will
receive more resources simply by paying lower taxes. However, the size of these consumption
gains is larger for the average treatment recipient (DID) than for a taxpayer who is near the
threshold (WDID). Using simple algebra and data on contractual earnings we can calculate the size
of these gains.42

The average gain is 4.5% for all taxpayers experiencing a tax cut.

Thus,

consumption could increase by 4.5% simply because reduced tax rates raise after-tax income even if
before-tax income is fixed. After subtracting windfall gains from the consumption response in the
DID estimates, we obtain an average 4% response in consumption due to the productivity effect.
Interestingly, when we augment the baseline SUR model with the differentiated response of
taxpayers in the middle (20%) and top (30%) brackets (Table A4), the response of consumption is
approximately 6–7% for the middle bracket and 15–16% for the top bracket (in the case of
41

A large increase in household income for the treatment group is consistent with Martinez-Vazquez et al. (2006)
finding a significant growth of individual earnings among high earners after the 2001 tax reform.
42
Specifically, we apply the pre-reform tax schedule to the post-reform contractual earnings and compute the
counterfactual after-tax earnings. The difference between this counterfactual measure and observed after-tax
contractual earnings is the windfall gain. After dividing the windfall gain by the after-tax earnings, we obtain a
percentage windfall gain.
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contractual earnings). After subtracting windfall gains, which are 3.3% in the middle and 10.5% in
the top tax brackets, the response of consumption due to increased productivity is between 2.7% and
5.5%.43
At the same time, the windfall gains are approximately zero for households who are close to
the threshold of 50,000 rubles. For example, the windfall gain for a taxpayer with 50,001 rubles is
(50,001− 50,000)⋅8%
50,001

≈ 0.0016% . Hence, consumption for these taxpayers can respond only to productivity

changes. Our WDID estimates of the consumption response have large standard errors, and we
cannot reject the hypothesis that the productivity effect is either zero or 4%, which is in agreement
with the DID estimates. In our view both WDID and DID estimates convey the same message that
the productivity effect is relatively small when compared with the evasion effect while the windfall
gains could be the main factor behind increased consumption.
While there are many margins of productivity adjustment to changes in tax rates, examining
the labor supply response can help us to assess the plausibility of our estimates of the productivity
response, especially in the short run when other margins may be less flexible. A small productivity
effect is consistent with a low elasticity of labor supply which is often estimated to fall between 0.1
and 0.5 for males and between 0.4 and 1.0 for females. If we assume that the elasticity of labor
supply is approximately 0.3 and that there is a fixed wage rate (i.e., wage rate does not vary with
labor supply or effort), the implied increase in earnings in the middle bracket should be
approximately 0.3 × 8% ≈ 2.4% . This estimate is in the ball park of the estimates we obtain in the
DID and WDID analyses.
In summary, the response of after-tax income can be decomposed into windfall gains (4–
5%), productivity effect (0–4%), and tax evasion effect (10–11%). Although the reform provided
more resources to households and could have increased labor supply, the main effect was improved

43

Like any other survey, RLMS is likely to miss the super rich households. However, individuals who fall into the
30% personal income tax bracket are quite affluent by Russian standards, and thus the reader could get a sense of the
evasion and consumption response of the rich.
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tax compliance.

The government lost some revenue due to lower tax rates, but it gained

substantially more revenue from enhanced reporting of income.
7.3. Welfare Calculations

In this subsection, we compute the deadweight loss from personal income tax in Russia and
assess the efficiency gains from the flat rate income tax reform. As a starting point, we first
calculate the deadweight loss by using the elasticity of observed taxable income to the tax rate as in
Feldstein (1999): DWL = 0.5t 2 (1 − t ) −1 eTI = −0.5t ∈TI , where the elasticity of taxable income with
respect to the after-tax rate (1 − t ) , eTI =

∂TI
∂ (1−t )

income with respect to the tax rate t, ∈TI =
of after-tax income ∈Y =

∂ (1−t ) wl
∂t

∂TI
∂t

× 1TI−t , is re-written in terms of the elasticity of taxable
× TIt . The last term ∈TI can be linked to the elasticity

× (1−tt ) wl through the following identity: ∈TI =∈Y + 1−t t .

According to our estimates, the elasticity of the after-tax income response to the change in
tax rates is ∈Y = (∂Y / Y ) × (t / ∂t ) = αY × (t / ∂t ) = 0.18 × 0.21/(−0.08) ≈ −0.47 , where αY is the point
estimate of the treatment effect in the log of income function (Table 9), and the tax rate includes 1%
contributions to the state pension fund.

Correspondingly, the elasticity of taxable income is

∈TI = −0.473 + t (1 − t ) −1 = −0.47 + 0.21(1 − 0.21) −1 ≈ −0.21 .

The equivalent elasticity of taxable

income with respect to the after-tax rate is 0.8, which falls in the range between 0.5 and 1.33 used
by Feldstein (1999) for the U.S. Thus, the deadweight loss is DWL = (−0.5) × 0.21× (−0.21) ≈ 2.2%
of total taxable income or about 20% of collected personal income tax revenue, which is
comparable to a 32% loss in the U.S. for much higher tax rates (Feldstein 1999). This estimate
suggests a significant welfare loss due to the personal income tax. 44

44

Slemrod (1994) and Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002) argue that elasticities estimated on variation due to tax reforms
may suffer from the Lucas critique because of simultaneous changes in many dimensions. As a result, estimated
elasticities may not have structural interpretation. However, our RD-type estimates are less likely to be contaminated
with other elements of the tax reform because taxpayers around the threshold tend to be similar along all dimensions but
income, and hence, at the margin, sources of variation other than the tax rate are not likely to be quantitatively
important. The similarity of WDID and DID estimates indicates that the estimated elasticity of the tax evasion and
productivity responses can be reasonably expected to closely approximate the structural elasticity of these responses to
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This estimate, however, does not take into account tax evasion and therefore could overstate
the social cost of taxes. We use our theoretical results from Section 7.1 to correct the estimate of
welfare losses in the presence of tax evasion. From our empirical analysis, we know the elasticity
of consumption response, which is ∈C = α C × (t / ∂t ) = 0.08 × 0.21/(−0.08) ≈ −0.21 , and the elasticity
of tax evasion response, which is ∈E = α e × (t / ∂t ) = −0.10 × 0.21/(−0.08) ≈ 0.26 . Equation (10) also
requires the effective tax rate κ that is estimated in the range from 0.14 to 0.17 using alternative
definitions of income and consumption in our data.
Given that the share of concealed income in total income is a quarter or less (see Section
7.1), we can provide an upper bound (in absolute terms) on the tax-evasion-corrected elasticity of
welfare with respect to tax changes ∈C +κ − wle ∈E = −0.21 + 0.14 − 0.25 × 0.26 = −0.135 and an upper
bound on the deadweight loss DWLC = −0.5t (∈Y * − wle ∈E ) = 1.4% of total earned income or 14.6%
of collected personal income taxes. This is substantial, yet it is only about two thirds of the loss
implied by the reported income elasticity. Using more conservative estimates of κ=0.17 and
e
wl

<0.25 will give us even smaller estimates of the deadweight loss.
Clearly, the traditional approach of using the elasticity of reported taxable income in welfare

calculations can significantly overstate the real welfare gains from the tax reform in the presence of
tax evasion. As we see from the Russian experience, tax evasion can make a tangible difference in
welfare calculations. We find that the deadweight loss due to the personal income tax can be at
least 30% smaller when adjusted for tax evasion. Consequently, the burden of personal income tax
and the welfare gains from reducing taxes are considerable, yet smaller than thought before.45

changes in tax rates. In further support of this assertion, we note that elasticities are similar for taxpayers in the 21%
and 31% brackets, which is an unlikely outcome if other elements of the tax reform had large effects on our estimated
elasticities.
45
The reform can have other benefits. For example, most developing and transitional countries badly need additional
tax revenues. Increasing tax rates on those who are not evading will create excess burden losses. Getting these
additional revenues from evaders is more equitable and less distortionary.

38

8. Conclusions

The 2001 Russian flat rate income tax reform has often been heralded as a success story and
has been credited with large increases in tax revenues and an improved business climate. Although
it has been difficult to differentiate between myth and reality with the Russian experience, many
other transitional countries have followed suit with flat rate income tax reforms, and an increasing
number of countries around the world are considering the adoption of a flat rate income tax. In this
paper we focus on the impact of the flat income tax rate on tax evasion, an issue that was, and
continues to be, a major problem in Russia as well as in many other transition and developing
countries. We argue that the flat tax reform was instrumental in decreasing tax evasion and that, to
a certain extent, greater fiscal revenues for Russia in 2001 and several years beyond can be linked to
increased voluntary tax compliance and reporting.
Since tax evasion is not directly observable when integral audit programs are lacking, we
use indirect techniques to measure the dynamics of tax evasion. Specifically, we use consumptionincome data and economic theory to estimate the effect of the tax reform on tax evasion. The core
theoretical argument is that under the permanent income hypothesis consumption should be equal to
permanent income. Assuming that consumption expenditures are fully reported, the discrepancy
between the log of consumption and the log of income, which we call the consumption-income gap,
indicates that households receive unreported income.
With the goal of separating the tax evasion effect of flat rate income tax reform from other
factors, we use the difference-in-difference approach and regression-discontinuity-type analysis in
various specifications. Regardless of the alternative variable definitions and methods used, we find
that ceteris paribus the consumption-income gap decreased by about 9 to 12 percent more for
households that experienced a reduction in marginal tax rates.

That is, the most significant

reduction in tax evasion was for taxpayers that experienced the largest decrease in tax rates after the
flat rate income tax was introduced. We also find that this decline in tax evasion was likely due to
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changes in voluntary compliance as opposed to greater enforcement effort by the tax administration
authorities.
In addition, in the paper we also analyze the productivity effect of the tax reform and find it
to be relatively small by comparison to the tax evasion effect. Specifically, the productivity effect,
measured by the relative increase in consumption for households that faced smaller tax rates after
the reform, is zero at the threshold and about 4 percent for the treatment group over the four-year
period. Obviously, this estimate is based on a relatively short sample of four years, and the long run
response could be larger.
These results in the paper have several important policy implications. The adoption of a flat
rate income tax is not expected to lead to significant increases in the tax revenues because the
productivity response is shown to be fairly small.

However, if the economy is plagued by

ubiquitous tax evasion, as was the case in Russia, then flat rate income tax reform can lead to
substantial revenue gains via increases in voluntary compliance. At the same time, given the
argument in Chetty (2008), a strong evasion response suggests that the efficiency gain from the
Russian tax reform perhaps is smaller than thought before.

Using observable responses of

consumption and income to tax changes, we find that the tax-evasion-adjusted deadweight loss from
personal income tax is at least 30% smaller than the loss implied from the standard method based on
the response of reported income to tax changes. Thus, although we find tangible efficiency gains
from the tax reform, they are not as large as implied by conventional approaches.
The paper also offers several contributions to the public finance literature. First, we provide
strong evidence of a positive relationship between (lower) tax rates and (lower) tax evasion. Until
now, cross-section studies in the tax evasion literature had provided ambiguous results. Second, the
paper offers a replicable empirical methodology for the estimation of tax evasion and changes in
productivity in response to tax reform in other countries provided there are a longitudinal household
budget survey and significant changes in the tax structure. Third, we develop a feasible framework
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to assess the deadweight loss from personal income tax in the presence of tax evasion based on the
consumption response to tax changes. Since this framework uses only observable data, it can be
widely implemented.
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Table 1: Russian Economy Before and After the Tax Reform

Nominal GDP, bln.
real growth, %
Annual CPI, end year
Budget deficit (-), bln.
Nominal tax revenues, bln.
real growth, %
Nominal tax revenues
from PIT, bln.
real growth, %
% of tax revenues
Top marginal PIT rate

1995
1585.0
-4.1
232.2
-49.1
353.3
…

1996
2200.2
-3.5
121.8
-94.2
464.3
-9.9

1997
2585.9
0.8
111.0
-127.9
593.4
11.1

1998
2741
-4.9
184.4
-155
524.8
-25.4

1999
4767
5.4
136.5
-44
891.4
-1.5

2000
7302
9.0
120.2
138
1481.9
20.7

2001
9041
5.0
118.6
265
1955.8
13.3

2002
10830.5
4.7
115.1
97
2331.0
3.0

2003
13243.2
7.3
112.0
174
2671.9
0.6

2004
16966.4
7.2
111.7
760
3299.6
4.7

2005
21598.0
6.4
110.9
1759
4627.2
15.7

36.7
…
10.4
30

56.7
6.0
12.2
35

75.6
15.9
12.7
35

72.2
-19.4
13.8
35

117.1
-5.9
13.1
45

174.3
8.1
11.8
30

255.5
25.8
13.1
13

357.8
21.1
15.3
13

455.3
11.7
17.0
13

574.2
6.9
17.4
13

706.6
1.6
15.3
13

Sources: Goskomstat (2004), Goskomstat (2006), Federal Tax Department website (www.nalog.ru).
Notes: All tax revenues are for the consolidated budget and exclude non-budgetary funds. Real growth of GDP and tax revenues is calculated using a GDP
deflator.
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Table 2: Tax Evasion Function, FE
lnC1-lnY1
N of HH members
N of senior HH members, 60+
N of children in HH, 18Year = 1998
Year = 2001
Year = 2002
Year = 2003
Year = 2004
HH head characteristics
Age
Years of schooling
Married
Currently works
Years of tenure
Works at enterprise
Works in private sector
Log (firm size)
N observations (households)
R2 overall
After reform trend (2001=1)

-0.010
(0.013)
-0.210***
(0.022)
0.088***
(0.022)
-0.026
(0.020)
-0.142***
(0.017)
-0.221***
(0.018)
-0.208***
(0.018)
-0.268***
(0.018)
-0.004***
(0.001)
-0.006
(0.004)
-0.093***
(0.024)
-0.298***
(0.055)
0.003**
(0.001)
-0.076*
(0.046)
-0.105***
(0.021)
-0.020***
(0.006)
24129 (6135)
0.05
-0.067***
(0.005)

lnC2-lnY1
Panel A
-0.033**
(0.013)
-0.200***
(0.022)
0.076***
(0.022)
-0.025
(0.020)
-0.139***
(0.017)
-0.213***
(0.018)
-0.203***
(0.018)
-0.262***
(0.018)
-0.004***
(0.001)
-0.004
(0.004)
-0.087***
(0.024)
-0.278***
(0.054)
0.003***
(0.001)
-0.083*
(0.045)
-0.105***
(0.021)
-0.019***
(0.006)
24129 (6135)
0.04
Panel B
-0.066***
(0.005)

lnC1-lnY2

lnC2-lnY2

0.018
(0.013)
-0.180***
(0.022)
0.034
(0.021)
-0.026
(0.020)
-0.140***
(0.018)
-0.216***
(0.018)
-0.217***
(0.018)
-0.265***
(0.018)

-0.005
(0.013)
-0.169***
(0.022)
0.023
(0.021)
-0.025
(0.020)
-0.137***
(0.018)
-0.208***
(0.018)
-0.213***
(0.018)
-0.260***
(0.018)

-0.002**
(0.001)
-0.007*
(0.004)
-0.060**
(0.023)
-0.151***
(0.052)
0.002*
(0.001)
-0.081*
(0.044)
-0.085***
(0.021)
-0.016***
(0.006)
24723 (6202)
0.03

-0.001*
(0.001)
-0.005
(0.004)
-0.053**
(0.023)
-0.130**
(0.052)
0.002**
(0.001)
-0.089**
(0.044)
-0.084***
(0.021)
-0.015***
(0.006)
24723 (6202)
0.03

-0.066***
(0.005)

-0.065***
(0.005)

Notes: We report Arellano (1987) robust standard errors in parentheses to control for arbitrary serial correlation; *
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Omitted categories are the year 2000 and the state sector.
All specifications are estimated on the full sample with household fixed effects (FE). HH denotes household. Household
head is the person with the largest income. The dependent variable - consumption-income gap - is defined in the text.
Besides the after-reform trend, the model estimated in Panel B includes the same set of covariates as in Panel A. Two
dummy variables for missing sector and firm size are included but not shown here. C1=expenditures on non-durable
goods, C2=C1+transfers, Y1=regular income, and Y2=Y1+irregular payments. The number of observations in
specifications with lnY2 is greater than that with lnY1 because the former specifications include the households reporting
irregular payments as the only source of their income.
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Table 3: Consumption-Income Gap and Attitudes toward Taxes, 1998 and 2002
Perception of tax payments
(at the district level)
Year = 2002
N observations
R2

lnC1-lnY1

lnC2-lnY1

lnC1-lnY2

lnC2-lnY2

0.266***
(0.102)
-0.172***
(0.020)
7539
0.09

0.254**
(0.102)
-0.161***
(0.020)
7539
0.07

0.359***
(0.102)
-0.170***
(0.020)
7806
0.05

0.348***
(0.102)
-0.160***
(0.020)
7806
0.04

Notes: We report Arellano (1987) robust standard errors in parentheses to control for arbitrary serial correlation; *
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Household head is the person with the largest income.
The dependent variable - consumption-income gap - is defined in the text. Perception of tax payments is a district-level
measure for the share of individuals who believe that most people don’t pay taxes or pay taxes on less than half of their
income. Besides perception of tax payments, the model includes the same set of covariates as in Table 2.
C1=expenditures on non-durable goods, C2=C1+transfers, Y1=regular income, and Y2=Y1+irregular payments.
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Table 4: Tax Enforcement in Russia Before and After the Tax Reform
1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

Tax Audits
Accrued tax revenues from tax audits and
sanctions, bln. Rubles
Of which received, bln. rubles

189c

283

274

220.6

261

30.5

41.6

59.7

68.7

NA

Number of on-site audits, thousands

796

690

605

468.2

331.9

Number of on-site audits of individual
entrepreneurs, thousands
Accrued tax revenues from on-site audits,
bln rubles
of which received, bln rubles

759c

664

415

222.9

124.1

49.7

75

68.4

NA

47.7

20.3

21

17.8

NA

NA

Charges for Tax Law Violations
Administrative charges against enterprise
managers, thousands people
Administrative charges against individual
entrepreneurs, thousands people
Total amount of charges, millions rubles
Number of blocked bank accounts,
thousands
Number of cases sent to the tax police for
further investigation, thousands
Of which number of criminal cases opened,
thousands

329

350

312

186

NA

480

510

289

96

NA

195

247

255

150

NA

172

256

344

408

NA

NA

14.4

17

13.4

9.5

1.3

3.2

4

2.6

1.1

Source: Federal Tax Department archive (www.nalog.ru); c – calculated from percentage changes reported in 2000.
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Table 5: Tax Evasion Function: Difference-in-Difference Approach, FE
N of HH members
N of senior HH members, 60+
N of children in HH, 18Year = 1998
Year = 2002
Year = 2003
Year = 2004
HH head characteristics
Age
Years of schooling
Married
Currently works
Years of tenure
Works at enterprise
Works in private sector
Log (firm size)
After reform dummy (Dp)
dtreat × Dp

N observations (households)
R2 overall

lnC1-lnY1

lnC2-lnY1

lnC1-lnY2

lnC2-lnY2

-0.016
(0.014)
-0.181***
(0.027)
0.087***
(0.022)
-0.020
(0.025)
-0.073***
(0.020)
-0.076***
(0.020)
-0.136***
(0.021)

-0.037***
(0.014)
-0.173***
(0.027)
0.077***
(0.022)
-0.016
(0.025)
-0.068***
(0.020)
-0.073***
(0.020)
-0.129***
(0.021)

0.014
(0.014)
-0.159***
(0.026)
0.034
(0.022)
-0.028
(0.025)
-0.072***
(0.020)
-0.080***
(0.019)
-0.128***
(0.020)

-0.007
(0.014)
-0.152***
(0.026)
0.024
(0.022)
-0.025
(0.025)
-0.066***
(0.019)
-0.077***
(0.019)
-0.120***
(0.020)

-0.004***
(0.001)
-0.007
(0.005)
-0.070***
(0.027)
-0.293***
(0.055)
0.002*
(0.001)
-0.083*
(0.046)
-0.100***
(0.021)
-0.019***
(0.006)
-0.103***
(0.031)
-0.109***
(0.033)
17081 (4174)
0.06

-0.003***
(0.001)
-0.006
(0.005)
-0.071***
(0.027)
-0.277***
(0.055)
0.002*
(0.001)
-0.084*
(0.046)
-0.099***
(0.021)
-0.018***
(0.006)
-0.104***
(0.031)
-0.108***
(0.033)
17081 (4174)
0.05

-0.002**
(0.001)
-0.010**
(0.005)
-0.031
(0.026)
-0.158***
(0.052)
0.001
(0.001)
-0.081*
(0.043)
-0.085***
(0.021)
-0.014**
(0.006)
-0.106***
(0.031)
-0.105***
(0.033)
17444 (4184)
0.04

-0.001
(0.001)
-0.009*
(0.005)
-0.030
(0.026)
-0.142***
(0.051)
0.002
(0.001)
-0.083*
(0.043)
-0.083***
(0.021)
-0.013**
(0.006)
-0.107***
(0.031)
-0.102***
(0.033)
17444 (4184)
0.04

Notes: We report Arellano (1987) robust standard errors in parentheses to control for arbitrary serial correlation; *
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Omitted categories are the state sector and years 2000 and
2001. All specifications are estimated on the full sample with household fixed effects (FE). HH denotes household.
Household head is the person with the largest income. The dependent variable - consumption-income gap - is defined in
the text. Treatment and control groups are defined on the basis of post-reform unadjusted for inflation earnings received in
the last month. The sample includes households whose head is a wage earner (in contrast to Table 2 that is based on the
full sample). Two dummy variables for missing sector and firm size are included but not shown here. C1=expenditures on
non-durable goods, C2=C1+transfers, Y1=regular income, and Y2=Y1+irregular payments.
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Table 6: Treatment Effect in the Difference-in-Difference Approach
Alternative Specifications

lnC1-lnY1

lnC2-lnY1

lnC1-lnY2

lnC2-lnY2

Panel A. Upper brackets × after reform dummy (Dp = 1 if 2001-2004)
Contractual earnings
Full sample
-0.095***
-0.091***
-0.101***
(0.032)
(0.032)
(0.032)
[17287]
[17287]
[17684]
Restricted sample in current prices
-0.117***
-0.109***
-0.120***
(0.034)
(0.034)
(0.034)
[14812]
[14812]
[15123]
Restricted sample in fixed prices
-0.111***
-0.117***
-0.099***
(0.033)
(0.033)
(0.033)
[14166]
[14166]
[14455]
Restricted sample with
-0.122***
-0.109***
-0.118***
(0.035)
(0.036)
(0.036)
district × year interactions
[14812]
[14812]
[15123]
Restricted sample using the 4-year
-0.131***
-0.128***
-0.145***
average of contractual earnings
(0.032)
(0.032)
(0.032)
[14812]
[14812]
[15123]
Restricted sample without
-0.116***
-0.109***
-0.123***
households with potentially large
(0.035)
(0.035)
(0.035)
deductions
[13322]
[13322]
[13615]
Restricted sample without
-0.123***
-0.115***
-0.136***
households with purchases of
(0.034)
(0.034)
(0.034)
declared durables
[14522]
[14522]
[14826]

-0.096***
(0.032)
[17684]
-0.112***
(0.034)
[15123]
-0.104***
(0.033)
[14455]
-0.107***
(0.036)
[15123]
-0.142***
(0.032)
[15123]
-0.117***
(0.035)
[13615]
-0.129***
(0.034)
[14826]

Panel B. Upper brackets × after reform time trend (tp = 1 if 2001)
Contractual earnings
Full sample
Restricted sample in current prices
Earnings received last month
Full sample
Restricted sample in current prices

-0.033***
(0.010)
-0.037***
(0.011)

-0.031***
(0.010)
-0.033***
(0.011)

-0.034***
(0.010)
-0.040***
(0.010)

-0.032***
(0.010)
-0.036***
(0.010)

-0.038***
(0.010)
-0.036***
(0.011)

-0.036***
(0.010)
-0.034***
(0.011)

-0.034***
(0.010)
-0.039***
(0.011)

-0.032***
(0.010)
-0.037***
(0.011)

Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses and the number of observations is in brackets; * significant at 10%;
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. We use Arellano (1987) robust standard errors to correct for arbitrary
serial correlation. The dependent variable - consumption-income gap - is defined in the text. Reported are the
estimated coefficients on the interaction term between the treatment group (upper brackets) and a post-reform dummy
(or trend in Panel B) using different measures of earnings and samples. All specifications are estimated with
household fixed effects and include the same set of variables as in equation (3) and Table 5. The number of
observations in panels B is the same as in Panel A. C1=expenditures on non-durable goods, C2=C1+transfers,
Y1=regular income, and Y2=Y1+irregular payments. Households with potentially large deductions are defined as
households with recent (2001-2004) purchases of real estate (apartments, houses, dachas, and land) or with
expenditures on education in excess of 200 rubles per month, which when annualized amounts to about 10% of
maximum deduction for educational expenditures. Households with purchases of declared durables are those that
purchased real estate, vehicles, and stocks that title organizations are required to report to tax authorities after January
1, 2000. Restricted sample includes only households with household head’s gross income between 20,000 and
100,000 rubles per year. For incomes in this range, employers pay the same social tax and employees are not eligible
for standard deductions.
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Table 7: Treatment Effect in the Difference-in-Difference Approach: Heterogeneous Response
Alternative Specifications
State vs. public sector
dtreat × Dp (State sector is omitted)
dtreat × Dp × Private
N observations
Blue collar vs. White collar
dtreat × Dp × Private
(Blue collar workers are omitted)
dtreat × Dp × Private × White collar
N observations

lnC1-lnY1

lnC2-lnY1

lnC1-lnY2

lnC2-lnY2

0.001
(0.054)
-0.229***
(0.080)
17287

-0.017
(0.054)
-0.192**
(0.080)
17287

-0.014
(0.052)
-0.236***
(0.079)
17684

-0.030
(0.052)
-0.201**
(0.079)
17684

-0.111
(0.103)
-0.302**
(0.123)
17287

-0.073
(0.103)
-0.308**
(0.125)
17287

-0.133
(0.099)
-0.295**
(0.124)
17684

-0.097
(0.099)
-0.297**
(0.124)
17684

Notes: We report Arellano (1987) robust standard errors in parentheses to control for arbitrary serial correlation; *
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent variable - consumption-income gap - is
defined in the text. Reported are the estimated coefficients on the interaction term between the treatment group (upper
brackets) and a post-reform dummy using different measures of earnings. Treatment and control group are defined on
the basis of post-reform contractual earnings. All specifications are estimated with household fixed effects and include
the same set of variables as in equation (3) and Table 4. C1=expenditures on non-durable goods, C2=C1+transfers,
Y1=regular income, and Y2=Y1+irregular payments.
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Table 8: Treatment Effect in the Weighted Difference-in-Difference Approach
Alternative specifications
Earnings received last month
N observations (weighted)
R2 overall
Contractual earnings
N observations (weighted)
R2 overall

lnC1-lnY1

lnC2-lnY1

lnC1-lnY2

lnC2-lnY2

-0.120**
(0.050)
16909
0.11

-0.120**
(0.050)
16909
0.11

-0.123***
(0.050)
17261
0.09

-0.123**
(0.050)
17261
0.08

-0.098**
(0.048)
17180
0.11

-0.095**
(0.048)
17180
0.10

-0.109**
(0.047)
17571
0.08

-0.108**
(0.046)
17571
0.07

Notes: We report Arellano (1987) robust standard errors in parentheses to correct for arbitrary serial correlation; *
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent variable - consumption-income gap is defined in the text. Reported are the estimated coefficients on the interaction term between the treatment group
(upper brackets) and a post-reform dummy. All specifications are estimated by weighted least squares with
household fixed effects, and include the same set of variables as in equation (3) and Table 4. The WDID approach
produces the same estimates for both full and restricted samples because observations beyond the restricted sample
have zero weights. C1=expenditures on non-durable goods, C2=C1+transfers, Y1=regular income, and
Y2=Y1+irregular payments.
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Table 9: Tax Evasion vs. Productivity Effects
Alternative specifications

Earnings received last month
N observations
R2 overall
Contractual earnings
N observations
R2 overall

Earnings received last month
N observations
R2 overall
Contractual earnings
N observations
R2 overall

lnY1

lnC1

lnY2

lnC2

Difference-in-difference
0.189***
0.080***
(0.029)
(0.024)
17081
17081
0.23
0.18

0.188***
(0.030)
17444
0.21

0.087***
(0.024)
17444
0.17

0.175***
(0.028)
17287
0.22

0.184***
(0.029)
17684
0.21

0.088***
(0.023)
17684
0.17

0.106**
(0.044)
17261
0.24

-0.017
(0.035)
17261
0.19

0.130***
(0.043)
17571
0.25

0.022
(0.037)
17571
0.20

0.080***
(0.023)
17287
0.18

Weighted difference-in-difference
0.101***
-0.019
(0.045)
(0.036)
16909
16909
0.25
0.20
0.117***
(0.041)
17180
0.26

0.018
(0.037)
17180
0.21

Notes: We report Arellano (1987) robust standard errors in parentheses to correct for arbitrary serial correlation; *
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Reported are the estimated coefficients on the
interaction term between the treatment group (upper brackets) and a post-reform dummy. All specifications are
estimated on the full sample with household fixed effects and include the same set of variables as in equation (3) and
Table 4. C1=expenditures on non-durable goods, C2=C1+transfers, Y1=regular income, and Y2=Y1+irregular
payments. The estimates are obtained from the two systems of simultaneous equations: a) lnY1 and lnC1 and b)
lnY2 and lnC2.
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Figure 1: Comparison of RLMS with Official Statistics
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Notes: The RLMS measure of household disposable income per capita is after taxes and transfers given,
and it excludes in-kind consumption, such as owner-occupied housing and home-grown food. The matching
NIPA measure is disposable income for the “household account” after taxes and transfers minus in-kind
consumption (Goskomstat 2007a). Both RLMS and NIPA measures of consumption per capita include
expenditures on durables but exclude imputed in-kind expenditures (Goskomstat 2007a). All RLMS
measures are deflated using monthly CPI and the date of interview. All NIPA measures are deflated using
annual average CPI. RLMS income and consumption for 1997 are imputed using the lagged RLMS value
multiplied by the 1997 growth rate from NIPA. The 1998 discrepancy in Panel B can be explained by the
fact that RLMS has been conducted right after the August financial crisis while NIPA’s numbers are
averaged over the year. Official numbers of saving rate are obtained from the Household Budget Survey
(Goskomstat 2007b).
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Figure 2: Consumption-Income Gap Dynamics for Treatment and Control Groups
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Notes: The figure shows annual means of the consumption-income gap for treatment and control groups after
controlling for observable characteristics and household fixed effects. Treatment and control group are defined on
the basis of post-reform contractual earnings.
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Figure 3: Income Distribution Below and Above the Threshold
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Notes: The histograms display income distribution before and after the 2001 flat tax reform. The vertical line
indicates the threshold in the personal income tax. Before the reform (2000), individuals to the left of the line paid
12% personal income tax rate and 1% pension fund contributions. Individuals to the right of the line paid 20% (or
30% for higher incomes) personal income tax rate and 1% pension fund contributions.
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Table A1: Summary Statistics

6462
(5995)
6922
(6743)
7816
(11566)
5768
(12939)
6442
(7134)
7317
(12392)
6573
(7242)
3.089
(1.322)
0.329
(0.609)
0.829
(0.862)
42.229
(14.084)
11.869
(2.632)
0.583
(0.493)
0.833
(0.373)
17046

Treatment
Group
7608
(6675)
8135
(7453)
9393
(13420)
6767
(15336)
7880
(7017)
8822
(13005)
7973
(7184)
3.184
(1.286)
0.288
(0.575)
0.864
(0.845)
40.622
(12.981)
12.234
(2.465)
0.618
(0.486)
0.884
(0.321)
5959

Control
Group
4331
(3592)
4667
(4348)
4884
(5863)
3909
(6003)
3767
(6555)
4517
(10610)
3969
(6600)
2.911
(1.370)
0.406
(0.661)
0.765
(0.889)
45.219
(15.498)
11.190
(2.793)
0.518
(0.500)
0.740
(0.439)
11087

8.080
(9.376)
0.930
(0.255)
0.439
(0.496)
0.449
(0.497)
3.357
(2.749)
14203

7.639
(9.006)
0.927
(0.260)
0.390
(0.488)
0.502
(0.500)
3.473
(2.826)
4407

9.062
(10.082)
0.938
(0.241)
0.548
(0.498)
0.331
(0.470)
3.098
(2.552)
9796

All
C1
C2
C3
C4
Y1
Y2
Y3
N of HH members
N of senior HH members, 60+
N of children in HH, 18Age
Years of schooling
Married
Currently works
N1
Years of tenure
Works at enterprise
Works in state sector
Works in private sector
Log (firm size)
N2

Notes: All income and consumption measures are in December 2002 rubles. HH denotes household. Household
head is the person with largest earnings. N1 includes the same households as in column 1 of Table 4 whose head
was employed at least once after the reform. N2 includes only those households whose head is currently employed
in any given year. C1=expenditures on non-durable goods, C2=C1+transfers, C3=C1+purchases of durables,
C4=C1+net savings, Y1=regular income, Y2=Y1+irregular payments, and Y3=Y1+income from selling home
grown goods. Treatment and control groups are defined on the basis of post-reform contractual earnings.
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Table A2: Tax Evasion Function with Alternative Measures of Income and Expenditures:
Difference-in-Difference Approach, FE

N of HH members
N of senior HH members, 60+
N of children in HH, 18Year = 1998
Year = 2002
Year = 2003
Year = 2004
HH head characteristics
Age
Years of schooling
Married
Currently works
Years of tenure
Works at enterprise
Works in private sector
Log (firm size)
After reform dummy (Dp)
Upper brackets × Dp
N observations (households)
R2 overall

lnC3-lnY1 with

lnC4-lnY1 with

lnC1-lnY3 with

Purchases of Durables
-0.002
(0.015)
-0.212***
(0.028)
0.081***
(0.023)
-0.044*
(0.026)
-0.058***
(0.021)
-0.051**
(0.021)
-0.107***
(0.022)

Net Savings
-0.028*
(0.016)
-0.149***
(0.029)
0.083***
(0.025)
-0.033
(0.027)
-0.060***
(0.022)
-0.040*
(0.022)
-0.106***
(0.022)

Home Production
-0.019
(0.014)
-0.170***
(0.026)
0.088***
(0.022)
-0.003
(0.025)
-0.073***
(0.020)
-0.084***
(0.020)
-0.135***
(0.020)

-0.004***
(0.001)
-0.005
(0.005)
-0.067**
(0.028)
-0.297***
(0.058)
0.003**
(0.001)
-0.076
(0.048)
-0.093***
(0.023)
-0.021***
(0.006)
-0.110***
(0.032)
-0.091***
(0.034)
17059 (4174)
0.04

-0.004***
(0.001)
-0.010*
(0.005)
-0.038
(0.028)
-0.277***
(0.060)
0.002
(0.001)
-0.048
(0.049)
-0.068***
(0.023)
-0.021***
(0.006)
-0.098***
(0.033)
-0.105***
(0.035)
16373 (4152)
0.04

-0.004***
(0.001)
-0.006
(0.005)
-0.067***
(0.026)
-0.265***
(0.054)
0.002
(0.001)
-0.084*
(0.045)
-0.099***
(0.021)
-0.017***
(0.006)
-0.085***
(0.030)
-0.114***
(0.032)
17081 (4174)
0.05

Notes: We report Arellano (1987) robust standard errors in parentheses to correct for arbitrary serial correlation; *
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Omitted categories are the state sector and years 2000 and
2001. All specifications are estimated on the full sample with household fixed effects (FE). HH denotes household.
Household head is the person with the largest income. The dependent variable - consumption-income gap - is defined in the
text. Treatment and control groups are defined on the basis of post-reform unadjusted for inflation monthly earnings received
in the last month. The sample includes households whose head is a wage earner (in contrast to Table 2 that is based on the
full sample). Two dummy variables for missing sector and firm size are included but not shown here. C1=expenditures on
non-durable goods, C3=C1+purchases of durables, C4=C1+net savings, Y1=regular income, and Y3=Y1+income from
selling home grown goods.
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Table A3: Tax Evasion vs. Productivity Effects, Full Specification

lnY1
0.214***
(0.013)
0.069***
(0.024)
-0.140***
(0.022)
-0.224***
(0.023)
0.154***
(0.018)
0.239***
(0.019)
0.344***
(0.019)

lnC1
0.198***
(0.011)
-0.110***
(0.020)
-0.047***
(0.016)
-0.245***
(0.017)
0.077***
(0.013)
0.159***
(0.013)
0.203***
(0.013)

Weighted
Difference-in-Difference
lnY1
lnC1
0.242***
0.204***
(0.017)
(0.015)
0.045*
-0.121***
(0.028)
(0.029)
-0.174***
-0.062***
(0.027)
(0.021)
-0.238***
-0.292***
(0.030)
(0.025)
0.130***
0.100***
(0.024)
(0.017)
0.223***
0.167***
(0.024)
(0.018)
0.317***
0.217***
(0.024)
(0.018)

0.002**
(0.001)
0.009**
(0.005)
0.182***
(0.024)
0.434***
(0.049)
-0.002**
(0.001)
0.054
(0.041)
0.150***
(0.021)
0.026***
(0.006)
0.153***
(0.026)
0.175***
(0.028)
17287
0.22

-0.002***
(0.001)
0.002
(0.004)
0.105***
(0.019)
0.144***
(0.035)
-0.000
(0.001)
-0.031
(0.030)
0.055***
(0.015)
0.007*
(0.004)
0.041**
(0.020)
0.080***
(0.023)
17287
0.18

0.003**
(0.001)
0.009
(0.006)
0.158***
(0.034)
0.447***
(0.070)
-0.002
(0.002)
0.115**
(0.058)
0.137***
(0.027)
0.023***
(0.007)
0.172***
(0.039)
0.117***
(0.041)
17180
0.26

Difference-in-Difference
N of HH members
N of senior HH members, 60+
N of children in HH, 18Year = 1998
Year = 2001
Year = 2002
Year = 2003
HH head characteristics
Age
Years of schooling
Married
Currently works
Years of tenure
Works at enterprise
Works in private sector
Log (firm size)
After reform dummy (Dp)
Upper brackets*Dp
N observations (households)
R2 overall

-0.002**
(0.001)
0.005
(0.005)
0.116***
(0.028)
0.195***
(0.052)
-0.000
(0.001)
-0.021
(0.043)
0.028
(0.020)
0.010*
(0.006)
0.041
(0.033)
0.018
(0.037)
17180
0.21

Notes: We report Arellano (1987) robust standard errors in parentheses to correct for arbitrary serial correlation; *
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Omitted categories are the state sector and years
2000 and 2001. All specifications are estimated on the full sample with household fixed effects. C1=expenditures
on non-durable goods, C2=C1+transfers, Y1=regular income, and Y2=Y1+irregular payments. The estimates are
obtained from the system of two simultaneous equations lnY1 and lnC1. Two dummy variables for missing sector
and firm size are included but not shown here. Treatment and control groups are defined on the basis of post-reform
contractual earnings.
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Table A4: Tax Evasion vs. Productivity Effects
Alternative specifications
Upper brackets × Dp
31% top bracket × Dp
N observations
R2 overall
Upper brackets × Dp
31% top bracket × Dp
N observations
R2 overall

lnY1

lnC1

lnY2

lnC2

Earnings received last month
0.139***
0.052**
(0.030)
(0.025)
0.212***
0.120***
(0.041)
(0.032)
17081
17081
0.23
0.18

0.136***
(0.031)
0.225***
(0.041)
17444
0.21

0.059**
(0.025)
0.119***
(0.033)
17444
0.17

Contractual earnings
0.141***
0.063***
(0.029)
(0.024)
0.182***
0.091**
(0.046)
(0.036)
17287
17287
0.23
0.18

0.145***
(0.030)
0.207***
(0.046)
17684
0.21

0.070***
(0.024)
0.093**
(0.037)
17684
0.17

Notes: We report Arellano (1987) robust standard errors in parentheses to correct for arbitrary serial correlation; *
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Reported are the estimated coefficients on the
interaction of a post-reform dummy with the two upper brackets and the 31% top bracket. All specifications are
estimated on the full sample with household fixed effects and include the same set of variables as in equation (3) and
Table 4. C1=expenditures on non-durable goods, C2=C1+transfers, Y1=regular income, and Y2=Y1+irregular
payments. The estimates are obtained from the two systems of simultaneous equations: a) lnY1 and lnC1 and b)
lnY2 and lnC2.
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Appendix 1: Components of the Russia’s 2001 Personal Income Tax Reform
Main Components of the Reform
The reform introduced a flat PIT rate of 13 percent; it eliminated the existing
progressive rate schedule (with rates of 12 percent up to 50,000 rubles of annual
income, 20 percent for 50,001-150,000 rubles, and 30 percent above 150,000
rubles), and 1 percent individual contributions to the pension fund.
The number of deductions was reduced, and the standard deduction was
established in the amount of 400 rubles per month for annual income below
20,000 rubles.
All employer contributions to the social security funds (pensions, social insurance
and medical insurance) were unified into a social tax. The reform eliminated the
contribution to the employment fund and cut the existing flat rate from 38.5
percent, when all contributions were added together, to a regressive scale of 20
percent for annual worker payroll in excess of 100,000 rubles but less than
300,000 rubles; 10 percent of amounts in excess of 300,000 rubles but less than
600,000 rubles; and 5 percent for amounts in excess of 600,000 rubles. The 5
percent rate was cut to 2 percent on January 1, 2002.
Effective January 1, 2001, the tax code introduced 35 percent tax on income from
lotteries, prizes, gambling, large voluntary insurance contributions and excessive
interest payments and 30 percent tax on dividends (that is made subject to
withholding). The tax on dividends was cut to 6 percent on January 1, 2002.
The reform allowed deductions of charitable contributions up to 25 percent of
income; deductions of medical expenses up to 25,000 rubles; deductions of
education expenses up to 25,000 rubles; one-time housing deductions for the
purchase or construction of a home excluding interest paid on mortgage loans up
to 600,000 rubles; and one-time property deductions for the sale of real estate or
land plots in the amount that depends on the duration of ownership and the type of
the property.
Other Important Changes around the Reform Time
Part 1 of Tax Code was made effective January 1, 1999. Part 1 replaced the
draconian punishment structure by more reasonable penalties for tax-related
violations and provided a legal basis for the use of taxpayer identification number
but it also limited the enforcement power of the tax authorities.
Effective January 1, 2000, title organizations are required to report to tax
authorities the amount individuals spent on purchase of real estate, vehicles, gold,
stocks, and valuable art.
In December of 2001 the Government approved the Tax Administration
Development Program for 2002-2004. This program included provisions to
reform the structure of the tax administration and to develop integrated
information systems, among other measures.

Implications for Estimation
The design of the reforms allows us to identify the treatment and control groups
by applying the pre-reform threshold to post-reform income and implement both
DID and WDID methods in estimating the behavioral response to policy change.
The WDID estimates around the 50,000 rubles threshold are not affected by
deductions. The DID estimates are conducted on the restricted sample that
excludes individuals with income below 20,000 rubles.
The WDID estimates around the 50,000 rubles threshold are not affected by the
unified social tax. The DID estimates are performed on the restricted sample of
workers that are subject to the same social tax rate, with annual income between
20,000 rubles and 100,000 rubles.

Households in our sample do not hold significant financial assets. The average
share of capital income and insurance payments in disposable income is 0.6%.
The DID and WDID estimates are not sensitive to excluding households with
capital income and insurance payments.
Although the number of tax declarations with requested deductions increased
rapidly from 821 thousands in 2002 to 1.3 millions in 2004, it is less than 2
percent of individual taxpayers (from Federal Tax Department archive). More
than 85% of all requested deductions in 2002-2004 were for housing purchases
and education expenses. The DID and WDID estimates are not sensitive to
excluding households with recent purchases of real estate and education
expenses.
Implications for Estimation
Various measures of tax enforcement in Table 4 do not indicate significant
improvements in the work of tax administration over the sample period. To the
extent that the level of tax enforcement efforts is region-specific, we include
dummies for 38 local districts (counties) and their interaction with year dummies
in the DID specification. The WDID method accounts for changes in tax
enforcement by comparing households just below and just above the threshold,
with a similar probability of audit. As a robustness check, we exclude
households with recent purchases of real estate, vehicles, and stocks.
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